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Message-ID: <20200315192104.GD224162@linux.intel.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2020 21:21:04 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@...hat.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding
key semaphore
On Fri, Mar 13, 2020 at 11:21:00AM -0400, Waiman Long wrote:
> A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a
> keyutils test:
>
> [12537.027242] ======================================================
> [12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
> [12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - -
> [12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------
> [12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock:
> [12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
> [12537.208365]
> [12537.208365] but task is already holding lock:
> [12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
> [12537.270476]
> [12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock.
> [12537.270476]
> [12537.307209]
> [12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
> [12537.340754]
> [12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}:
> [12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110
> [12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280
> [12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70
> [12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80
> [12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
> [12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
> [12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
> [12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
> [12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
> [12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
> [12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
> [12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> [12537.636225]
> [12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}:
> [12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
> [12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70
> [12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80
> [12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
> [12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
> [12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
> [12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
> [12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
> [12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
> [12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
> [12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> [12537.908649]
> [12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}:
> [12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
> [12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs]
> [12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs]
> [12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs]
> [12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560
> [12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0
> [12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10
> [12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830
> [12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260
> [12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0
> [12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0
> [12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550
> [12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60
> [12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0
> [12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30
> [12538.243010]
> [12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
> [12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
> [12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
> [12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
> [12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
> [12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
> [12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
> [12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
> [12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
> [12538.435535]
> [12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this:
> [12538.435535]
> [12538.472829] Chain exists of:
> [12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class
> [12538.472829]
> [12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
> [12538.524820]
> [12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1
> [12538.572654] ---- ----
> [12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class);
> [12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock);
> [12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class);
> [12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
> [12538.687758]
> [12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK ***
> [12538.687758]
> [12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598:
> [12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
> [12538.770573]
> [12538.770573] stack backtrace:
> [12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
> [12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
> [12538.881963] Call Trace:
> [12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0
> [12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279
> [12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250
> [12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0
> [12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190
> [12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550
> [12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
> [12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0
> [12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0
> [12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10
> [12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
> [12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
> [12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
> [12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
> [12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
> [12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110
> [12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
> [12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
> [12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0
> [12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
> [12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
> [12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
>
> One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not
> allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead,
> an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the
> read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding
> the lock.
>
> That requires taking out the __user modifier from the read methods as
> well as additional changes to not use any userspace write helpers.
>
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
> ---
> include/linux/key-type.h | 2 +-
> security/keys/big_key.c | 11 ++---
> security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 7 ++-
> security/keys/keyctl.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++----
> security/keys/keyring.c | 6 +--
> security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 7 ++-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 14 +-----
> security/keys/user_defined.c | 5 +-
> 8 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
> index 4ded94bcf274..2ab2d6d6aeab 100644
> --- a/include/linux/key-type.h
> +++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
> @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ struct key_type {
> * much is copied into the buffer
> * - shouldn't do the copy if the buffer is NULL
> */
> - long (*read)(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen);
> + long (*read)(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
>
> /* handle request_key() for this type instead of invoking
> * /sbin/request-key (optional)
> diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
> index 001abe530a0d..82008f900930 100644
> --- a/security/keys/big_key.c
> +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
> @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
> * read the key data
> * - the key's semaphore is read-locked
> */
> -long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
> +long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
> {
> size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
> long ret;
> @@ -391,9 +391,8 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
>
> ret = datalen;
>
> - /* copy decrypted data to user */
> - if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf->virt, datalen) != 0)
> - ret = -EFAULT;
> + /* copy out decrypted data */
> + memcpy(buffer, buf->virt, datalen);
>
> err_fput:
> fput(file);
> @@ -401,9 +400,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
> big_key_free_buffer(buf);
> } else {
> ret = datalen;
> - if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data],
> - datalen) != 0)
> - ret = -EFAULT;
> + memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
> }
>
> return ret;
> diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
> index 60720f58cbe0..f6797ba44bf7 100644
> --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
> +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
> @@ -902,14 +902,14 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> }
>
> /*
> - * encrypted_read - format and copy the encrypted data to userspace
> + * encrypted_read - format and copy out the encrypted data
> *
> * The resulting datablob format is:
> * <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv> <encrypted data>
> *
> * On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size.
> */
> -static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
> +static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
> size_t buflen)
> {
> struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
> @@ -957,8 +957,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
> key_put(mkey);
> memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
>
> - if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0)
> - ret = -EFAULT;
> + memcpy(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len);
> kzfree(ascii_buf);
>
> return asciiblob_len;
> diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> index 9b898c969558..81f68e434b9f 100644
> --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
> +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> @@ -797,6 +797,21 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
> return ret;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Call the read method
> + */
> +static long __keyctl_read_key(struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
> +{
> + long ret;
> +
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + ret = key_validate(key);
> + if (ret == 0)
> + ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Read a key's payload.
> *
> @@ -844,16 +859,42 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
>
> /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
> can_read_key:
> - ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> - if (key->type->read) {
> - /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
> + if (!key->type->read) {
> + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + goto error2;
> + }
> +
> + if (!buffer || !buflen) {
> + /* Get the key length from the read method */
> + ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, NULL, 0);
> + } else {
> +
> + /*
> + * Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
> * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
> + *
> + * Allocating a temporary buffer to hold the keys before
> + * transferring them to user buffer to avoid potential
> + * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_sem.
> + */
> + char *tmpbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> + if (!tmpbuf) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto error2;
> + }
> + ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, tmpbuf, buflen);
> +
> + /*
> + * Read methods will just return the required length
> + * without any copying if the provided length isn't big
> + * enough.
> */
> - down_read(&key->sem);
> - ret = key_validate(key);
> - if (ret == 0)
> - ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
> - up_read(&key->sem);
> + if ((ret > 0) && (ret <= buflen)) {
> + if (copy_to_user(buffer, tmpbuf, ret))
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + }
> + kzfree(tmpbuf);
> }
>
> error2:
> diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
> index febf36c6ddc5..5ca620d31cd3 100644
> --- a/security/keys/keyring.c
> +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
> @@ -459,7 +459,6 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data)
> {
> struct keyring_read_iterator_context *ctx = data;
> const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
> - int ret;
>
> kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}",
> key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->buflen);
> @@ -467,10 +466,7 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data)
> if (ctx->count >= ctx->buflen)
> return 1;
>
> - ret = put_user(key->serial, ctx->buffer);
> - if (ret < 0)
> - return ret;
> - ctx->buffer++;
> + *ctx->buffer++ = key->serial;
> ctx->count += sizeof(key->serial);
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
> index ecba39c93fd9..41e9735006d0 100644
> --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
> +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
> @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
> static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
> static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
> static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
> -static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);
> +static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t);
>
> /*
> * The request-key authorisation key type definition.
> @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
> * - the key's semaphore is read-locked
> */
> static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
> - char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
> + char *buffer, size_t buflen)
> {
> struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key);
> size_t datalen;
> @@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
> if (buflen > datalen)
> buflen = datalen;
>
> - if (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0)
> - ret = -EFAULT;
> + memcpy(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen);
> }
>
> return ret;
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> index d2c5ec1e040b..8001ab07e63b 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> @@ -1130,11 +1130,10 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
> * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
> */
> -static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
> +static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
> size_t buflen)
> {
> const struct trusted_key_payload *p;
> - char *ascii_buf;
> char *bufp;
> int i;
>
> @@ -1143,18 +1142,9 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
> return -EINVAL;
>
> if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
> - ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!ascii_buf)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -
> - bufp = ascii_buf;
> + bufp = buffer;
> for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
> bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
> - if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) {
> - kzfree(ascii_buf);
> - return -EFAULT;
> - }
> - kzfree(ascii_buf);
> }
> return 2 * p->blob_len;
> }
> diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
> index 6f12de4ce549..07d4287e9084 100644
> --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
> +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
> @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe);
> * read the key data
> * - the key's semaphore is read-locked
> */
> -long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
> +long user_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
> {
> const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
> long ret;
> @@ -181,8 +181,7 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
> if (buflen > upayload->datalen)
> buflen = upayload->datalen;
>
> - if (copy_to_user(buffer, upayload->data, buflen) != 0)
> - ret = -EFAULT;
> + memcpy(buffer, upayload->data, buflen);
> }
>
> return ret;
> --
> 2.18.1
>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
/Jarkko
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