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Message-ID: <5e7113f16e7c6_278b2b1b264c65b445@john-XPS-13-9370.notmuch>
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 11:16:17 -0700
From: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
To: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>,
Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
kernel-team@...udflare.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] bpf: sockmap, sockhash: return file descriptors from
privileged lookup
Jakub Sitnicki wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 06:47 PM CET, Lorenz Bauer wrote:
> > Allow callers with CAP_NET_ADMIN to retrieve file descriptors from a
> > sockmap and sockhash. O_CLOEXEC is enforced on all fds.
> >
> > Without this, it's difficult to resize or otherwise rebuild existing
> > sockmap or sockhashes.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>
> > ---
> > net/core/sock_map.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
> > index 03e04426cd21..3228936aa31e 100644
> > --- a/net/core/sock_map.c
> > +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
> > @@ -347,12 +347,31 @@ static void *sock_map_lookup(struct bpf_map *map, void *key)
> > static int __sock_map_copy_value(struct bpf_map *map, struct sock *sk,
> > void *value)
> > {
> > + struct file *file;
> > + int fd;
> > +
> > switch (map->value_size) {
> > case sizeof(u64):
> > sock_gen_cookie(sk);
> > *(u64 *)value = atomic64_read(&sk->sk_cookie);
> > return 0;
> >
> > + case sizeof(u32):
> > + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > +
> > + fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
> > + if (unlikely(fd < 0))
> > + return fd;
> > +
> > + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
> > + file = get_file(sk->sk_socket->file);
>
> I think this deserves a second look.
>
> We don't lock the sock, so what if tcp_close orphans it before we enter
> this critical section? Looks like sk->sk_socket might be NULL.
>
> I'd find a test that tries to trigger the race helpful, like:
>
> thread A: loop in lookup FD from map
> thread B: loop in insert FD into map, close FD
Agreed, this was essentially my question above as well.
When the psock is created we call sock_hold() and will only do a sock_put()
after an rcu grace period when its removed. So at least if you have the
sock here it should have a sk_refcnt. (Note the user data is set to NULL
so if you do reference psock you need to check its non-null.)
Is that enough to ensure sk_socket? Seems not to me, tcp_close for example
will still happen and call sock_orphan(sk) based on my admittddly quick
look.
Further, even if you do check sk->sk_socket is non-null what does it mean
to return a file with a socket that is closed, deleted from the sock_map
and psock removed? At this point is it just a dangling reference?
Still a bit confused as well what would or should happen when the sock is closed
after you have the file reference? I could probably dig up what exactly
would happen but I think we need it in the commiit message so we understand
it. I also didn't dig up the details here but if the receiver of the
fd crashes or otherwise disappears this hopefully all get cleaned up?
>
> > + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
> > +
> > + fd_install(fd, file);
> > + *(u32 *)value = fd;
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > default:
> > return -ENOSPC;
> > }
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