linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v28 21/22] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call

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Message-ID: <acf660c0-7b8e-911c-8640-75fe43e5c384@intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:36:57 -0700
From:   "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@...el.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc:     Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@...hat.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        dave.hansen@...el.com, Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
        andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, bp@...en8.de,
        Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>, luto@...nel.org,
        kai.huang@...el.com, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Patrick Uiterwijk <puiterwijk@...hat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@...hat.com>,
        Harald Hoyer <harald@...hat.com>,
        Lily Sturmann <lsturman@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v28 21/22] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX
 enclave call

On 3/17/2020 3:09 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 17, 2020 at 02:40:34PM -0700, Xing, Cedric wrote:
>> Hi Nathaniel,
>>
>> I reread your email today and thought I might have misunderstood your email
>> earlier. What changes are you asking for exactly? Is that just passing @leaf
>> in %ecx rather than in %eax? If so, I wouldn't have any problem. I agree
>> with you that the resulted API would then be callable from C, even though it
>> wouldn't be able to return back to C due to tampered %rbx. But I think the
>> vDSO API can preserve %rbx too, given it is used by both EENTER and EEXIT
>> (so is unavailable for parameter passing anyway). Alternatively, the C
>> caller can setjmp() to be longjmp()'d back from within the exit handler.
> 
> Yep, exactly.  The other proposed change that is fairly straightforward is
> to make the save/restore of %rsp across the exit handler call relative
> instead of absolute, i.e. allow the exit handler to modify %rsp.  I don't
> think this would conflict with the Intel SDK usage model?
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
> index 94a8e5f99961..05d54f79b557 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
> @@ -139,8 +139,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
>          /* Pass the untrusted RSP (at exit) to the callback via %rcx. */
>          mov     %rsp, %rcx
> 
> -       /* Save the untrusted RSP in %rbx (non-volatile register). */
> +       /* Save the untrusted RSP offset in %rbx (non-volatile register). */
>          mov     %rsp, %rbx
> +       and     $0xf, %rbx
> 
>          /*
>           * Align stack per x86_64 ABI. Note, %rsp needs to be 16-byte aligned
> @@ -161,8 +162,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
>          mov     0x20(%rbp), %rax
>          call    .Lretpoline
> 
> -       /* Restore %rsp to its post-exit value. */
> -       mov     %rbx, %rsp
> +       /* Undo the post-exit %rsp adjustment. */
> +       lea     0x20(%rsp,%rbx), %rsp
> 
Yep. Though it looks a bit uncommon, I do think it will work.