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Message-Id: <20200317132157.1272-1-cai@lca.pw>
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 09:21:57 -0400
From: Qian Cai <cai@....pw>
To: akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: elver@...gle.com, catalin.marinas@....com, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Qian Cai <cai@....pw>
Subject: [PATCH -next] mm/kmemleak: annotate a data race in checksum
Even if KCSAN is disabled for kmemleak, update_checksum() could still
call crc32() (which is outside of kmemleak.c) to dereference
object->pointer. Thus, the value of object->pointer could be accessed
concurrently as noticed by KCSAN,
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in crc32_le_base / do_raw_spin_lock
write to 0xffffb0ea683a7d50 of 4 bytes by task 23575 on cpu 12:
do_raw_spin_lock+0x114/0x200
debug_spin_lock_after at kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:91
(inlined by) do_raw_spin_lock at kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:115
_raw_spin_lock+0x40/0x50
__handle_mm_fault+0xa9e/0xd00
handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x2f0
do_page_fault+0x263/0x6f9
page_fault+0x34/0x40
read to 0xffffb0ea683a7d50 of 4 bytes by task 839 on cpu 60:
crc32_le_base+0x67/0x350
crc32_le_base+0x67/0x350:
crc32_body at lib/crc32.c:106
(inlined by) crc32_le_generic at lib/crc32.c:179
(inlined by) crc32_le at lib/crc32.c:197
kmemleak_scan+0x528/0xd90
update_checksum at mm/kmemleak.c:1172
(inlined by) kmemleak_scan at mm/kmemleak.c:1497
kmemleak_scan_thread+0xcc/0xfa
kthread+0x1e0/0x200
ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
If a shattered value was returned due to a data race, it will be
corrected in the next scan. Thus, annotate it as an intentional data
race using the data_race() macro.
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@....pw>
---
mm/kmemleak.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/kmemleak.c b/mm/kmemleak.c
index e362dc3d2028..d3327756c3a4 100644
--- a/mm/kmemleak.c
+++ b/mm/kmemleak.c
@@ -1169,7 +1169,12 @@ static bool update_checksum(struct kmemleak_object *object)
u32 old_csum = object->checksum;
kasan_disable_current();
- object->checksum = crc32(0, (void *)object->pointer, object->size);
+ /*
+ * crc32() will dereference object->pointer. If an unstable value was
+ * returned due to a data race, it will be corrected in the next scan.
+ */
+ object->checksum = data_race(crc32(0, (void *)object->pointer,
+ object->size));
kasan_enable_current();
return object->checksum != old_csum;
--
2.21.0 (Apple Git-122.2)
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