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Message-ID: <f7c1508a-a456-6ae4-a81e-8e8aa41d8d39@virtuozzo.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2020 10:13:19 +0300
From: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
To: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
Andrei Vagin <avagin@...il.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
Yuyang Du <duyuyang@...il.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@....com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
Christian Kellner <christian@...lner.me>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
"Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
"stable@...r.kernel.org" <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-api@...r.kernel.org" <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] exec: Add a exec_update_mutex to replace
cred_guard_mutex
On 18.03.2020 23:06, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
> On 3/18/20 1:22 PM, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
>> On 18.03.2020 00:53, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
>>> On 3/17/20 9:56 AM, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
>>>> On 14.03.2020 12:11, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
>>>>> The cred_guard_mutex is problematic. The cred_guard_mutex is held
>>>>> over the userspace accesses as the arguments from userspace are read.
>>>>> The cred_guard_mutex is held of PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT as the the other
>>>>> threads are killed. The cred_guard_mutex is held over
>>>>> "put_user(0, tsk->clear_child_tid)" in exit_mm().
>>>>>
>>>>> Any of those can result in deadlock, as the cred_guard_mutex is held
>>>>> over a possible indefinite userspace waits for userspace.
>>>>>
>>>>> Add exec_update_mutex that is only held over exec updating process
>>>>> with the new contents of exec, so that code that needs not to be
>>>>> confused by exec changing the mm and the cred in ways that can not
>>>>> happen during ordinary execution of a process.
>>>>>
>>>>> The plan is to switch the users of cred_guard_mutex to
>>>>> exec_udpate_mutex one by one. This lets us move forward while still
>>>>> being careful and not introducing any regressions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20160921152946.GA24210@dhcp22.suse.cz/
>>>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/AM6PR03MB5170B06F3A2B75EFB98D071AE4E60@AM6PR03MB5170.eurprd03.prod.outlook.com/
>>>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20161102181806.GB1112@redhat.com/
>>>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20160923095031.GA14923@redhat.com/
>>>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170213141452.GA30203@redhat.com/
>>>>> Ref: 45c1a159b85b ("Add PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE and PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT facilities.")
>>>>> Ref: 456f17cd1a28 ("[PATCH] user-vm-unlock-2.5.31-A2")
>>>>> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> fs/exec.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
>>>>> include/linux/binfmts.h | 8 +++++++-
>>>>> include/linux/sched/signal.h | 9 ++++++++-
>>>>> init/init_task.c | 1 +
>>>>> kernel/fork.c | 1 +
>>>>> 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> v3: this update fixes lock-order and adds an explicit data member in linux_binprm
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
>>>>> index d820a72..11974a1 100644
>>>>> --- a/fs/exec.c
>>>>> +++ b/fs/exec.c
>>>>> @@ -1014,12 +1014,17 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
>>>>> {
>>>>> struct task_struct *tsk;
>>>>> struct mm_struct *old_mm, *active_mm;
>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>>
>>>>> /* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */
>>>>> tsk = current;
>>>>> old_mm = current->mm;
>>>>> exec_mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
>>>>>
>>>>> + ret = mutex_lock_killable(&tsk->signal->exec_update_mutex);
>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>> + return ret;
>>>>> +
>>>>> if (old_mm) {
>>>>> sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
>>>>> /*
>>>>> @@ -1031,9 +1036,11 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
>>>>> down_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
>>>>> if (unlikely(old_mm->core_state)) {
>>>>> up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem);
>>>>> + mutex_unlock(&tsk->signal->exec_update_mutex);
>>>>> return -EINTR;
>>>>> }
>>>>> }
>>>>> +
>>>>> task_lock(tsk);
>>>>> active_mm = tsk->active_mm;
>>>>> membarrier_exec_mmap(mm);
>>>>> @@ -1288,11 +1295,12 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
>>>>> goto out;
>>>>>
>>>>> /*
>>>>> - * After clearing bprm->mm (to mark that current is using the
>>>>> - * prepared mm now), we have nothing left of the original
>>>>> + * After setting bprm->called_exec_mmap (to mark that current is
>>>>> + * using the prepared mm now), we have nothing left of the original
>>>>> * process. If anything from here on returns an error, the check
>>>>> * in search_binary_handler() will SEGV current.
>>>>> */
>>>>> + bprm->called_exec_mmap = 1;
>>>>
>>>> The two below is non-breaking pair:
>>>>
>>>> exec_mmap(bprm->mm);
>>>> bprm->called_exec_mmap = 1;
>>>>
>>>> Why not move this into exec_mmap(), so nobody definitely inserts something
>>>> between them?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Hmm, could be done, but then I would probably need a different name than
>>> "called_exec_mmap".
>>>
>>> How about adding a nice function comment to exec_mmap that calls out the
>>> changed behaviour that the exec_update_mutex is taken unless the function
>>> fails?
>>
>> Not sure, I understand correct.
>>
>> Could you post this like a small patch hunk (on top of anything you want)?
>>
>
> I was thinking of something like that:
>
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1010,6 +1010,11 @@ ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(read_code);
>
> +/*
> + * Maps the mm_struct mm into the current task struct.
> + * On success, this function returns with the mutex
> + * exec_update_mutex locked.
> + */
Looks OK for me.
> static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
> {
> struct task_struct *tsk;
>
>
>>> Bernd.
>>>
>>>
>>>>> bprm->mm = NULL;
>>>>>
>>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
>>>>> @@ -1438,6 +1446,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>>>>> {
>>>>> free_arg_pages(bprm);
>>>>> if (bprm->cred) {
>>>>> + if (bprm->called_exec_mmap)
>>>>> + mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex);
>>>>> mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
>>>>> abort_creds(bprm->cred);
>>>>> }
>>>>> @@ -1487,6 +1497,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>>>>> * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
>>>>> */
>>>>> security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
>>>>> + mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex);
>>>>> mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
>>>>> }
>>>>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
>>>>> @@ -1678,7 +1689,7 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>>>>>
>>>>> read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
>>>>> put_binfmt(fmt);
>>>>> - if (retval < 0 && !bprm->mm) {
>>>>> + if (retval < 0 && bprm->called_exec_mmap) {
>>>>> /* we got to flush_old_exec() and failed after it */
>>>>> read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
>>>>> force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV);
>>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
>>>>> index b40fc63..a345d9f 100644
>>>>> --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
>>>>> +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
>>>>> @@ -44,7 +44,13 @@ struct linux_binprm {
>>>>> * exec has happened. Used to sanitize execution environment
>>>>> * and to set AT_SECURE auxv for glibc.
>>>>> */
>>>>> - secureexec:1;
>>>>> + secureexec:1,
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * Set by flush_old_exec, when exec_mmap has been called.
>>>>> + * This is past the point of no return, when the
>>>>> + * exec_update_mutex has been taken.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + called_exec_mmap:1;
>>>>> #ifdef __alpha__
>>>>> unsigned int taso:1;
>>>>> #endif
>>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
>>>>> index 8805025..a29df79 100644
>>>>> --- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
>>>>> +++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
>>>>> @@ -224,7 +224,14 @@ struct signal_struct {
>>>>>
>>>>> struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on
>>>>> * credential calculations
>>>>> - * (notably. ptrace) */
>>>>> + * (notably. ptrace)
>>>>> + * Deprecated do not use in new code.
>>>>> + * Use exec_update_mutex instead.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + struct mutex exec_update_mutex; /* Held while task_struct is being
>>>>> + * updated during exec, and may have
>>>>> + * inconsistent permissions.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> } __randomize_layout;
>>>>>
>>>>> /*
>>>>> diff --git a/init/init_task.c b/init/init_task.c
>>>>> index 9e5cbe5..bd403ed 100644
>>>>> --- a/init/init_task.c
>>>>> +++ b/init/init_task.c
>>>>> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
>>>>> .multiprocess = HLIST_HEAD_INIT,
>>>>> .rlim = INIT_RLIMITS,
>>>>> .cred_guard_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(init_signals.cred_guard_mutex),
>>>>> + .exec_update_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(init_signals.exec_update_mutex),
>>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
>>>>> .posix_timers = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_signals.posix_timers),
>>>>> .cputimer = {
>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
>>>>> index 8642530..036b692 100644
>>>>> --- a/kernel/fork.c
>>>>> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
>>>>> @@ -1594,6 +1594,7 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
>>>>> sig->oom_score_adj_min = current->signal->oom_score_adj_min;
>>>>>
>>>>> mutex_init(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
>>>>> + mutex_init(&sig->exec_update_mutex);
>>>>>
>>>>> return 0;
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>
>>
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