linux-kernel - Re: [Patch][Fix] crypto: arm{,64} neon: memzero

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Message-ID: <20200319081536.GA20670@willie-the-truck>
Date:   Thu, 19 Mar 2020 08:15:37 +0000
From:   Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc:     Torsten Duwe <duwe@....de>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
        "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" 
        <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Patch][Fix] crypto: arm{,64} neon: memzero_explicit aes-cbc key

On Wed, Mar 18, 2020 at 04:13:33PM -0400, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Mar 2020 at 18:17, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > [+Ard]
> >
> > On Fri, Mar 13, 2020 at 12:02:58PM +0100, Torsten Duwe wrote:
> > > From: Torsten Duwe <duwe@...e.de>
> > >
> > > At function exit, do not leave the expanded key in the rk struct
> > > which got allocated on the stack.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@...e.de>
> > > ---
> > > Another small fix from our FIPS evaluation. I hope you don't mind I merged
> > > arm32 and arm64 into one patch -- this is really simple.
> > > --- a/arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
> > > +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
> > > @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static int aesbs_cbc_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
> > >       kernel_neon_begin();
> > >       aesbs_convert_key(ctx->key.rk, rk.key_enc, ctx->key.rounds);
> > >       kernel_neon_end();
> > > +     memzero_explicit(&rk, sizeof(rk));
> > >
> > >       return crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->enc_tfm, in_key, key_len);
> > >  }
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
> > > index e3e27349a9fe..c0b980503643 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
> > > @@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ static int aesbs_cbc_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
> > >       kernel_neon_begin();
> > >       aesbs_convert_key(ctx->key.rk, rk.key_enc, ctx->key.rounds);
> > >       kernel_neon_end();
> > > +     memzero_explicit(&rk, sizeof(rk));
> > >
> > >       return 0;
> > >  }
> >
> > I'm certainly not a crypto person, but this looks sensible to me and I
> > couldn't find any other similar stack variable usage under
> > arch/arm64/crypto/ at a quick glance.
> >
> > Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
> >
> 
> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>

Cheers, Ard. I'm assuming that Herbert will pick this up via the crypto
tree.

Will