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Message-Id: <20200325194317.526492-11-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 15:43:15 -0400
From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@...cle.com, dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com,
tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com,
trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH 10/12] x86: Secure Launch adding event log securityfs
From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com>
The late init functionality registers securityfs nodes to allow fetching
of and writing events to the late launch TPM log.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 184 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c
index 083fa72bd9f9..fea15b0e36b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c
@@ -449,3 +449,187 @@ void __init slaunch_setup(void)
vendor[3] == INTEL_CPUID_MFGID_EDX)
slaunch_setup_intel();
}
+
+/*
+ * Securityfs exposure
+ */
+struct memfile {
+ char *name;
+ void __iomem *addr;
+ size_t size;
+};
+
+static struct memfile sl_evtlog = {"eventlog", 0, 0};
+static void __iomem *txt_heap;
+static struct txt_heap_event_log_pointer2_1_element __iomem *evtlog20;
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(sl_evt_write_mutex);
+
+static ssize_t sl_evtlog_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, pos,
+ sl_evtlog.addr, sl_evtlog.size);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sl_evtlog_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *data;
+ ssize_t result;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ data = memdup_user(buf, datalen);
+ if (IS_ERR(data)) {
+ result = PTR_ERR(data);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&sl_evt_write_mutex);
+ if (evtlog20)
+ result = tpm20_log_event(evtlog20, sl_evtlog.addr,
+ datalen, data);
+ else
+ result = tpm12_log_event(sl_evtlog.addr, datalen, data);
+ mutex_unlock(&sl_evt_write_mutex);
+
+ kfree(data);
+out:
+ return result;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sl_evtlog_ops = {
+ .read = sl_evtlog_read,
+ .write = sl_evtlog_write,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+#define SL_DIR_ENTRY 1 /* directoy node must be last */
+#define SL_FS_ENTRIES 2
+
+static struct dentry *fs_entries[SL_FS_ENTRIES];
+
+static long slaunch_expose_securityfs(void)
+{
+ long ret = 0;
+ int entry = SL_DIR_ENTRY;
+
+ fs_entries[entry] = securityfs_create_dir("slaunch", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(fs_entries[entry])) {
+ pr_err("Error creating securityfs sl_evt_log directory\n");
+ ret = PTR_ERR(fs_entries[entry]);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (sl_evtlog.addr > 0) {
+ entry--;
+ fs_entries[entry] = securityfs_create_file(sl_evtlog.name,
+ S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
+ fs_entries[SL_DIR_ENTRY], NULL,
+ &sl_evtlog_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(fs_entries[entry])) {
+ pr_err("Error creating securityfs %s file\n",
+ sl_evtlog.name);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(fs_entries[entry]);
+ goto err_dir;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_dir:
+ securityfs_remove(fs_entries[SL_DIR_ENTRY]);
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void slaunch_teardown_securityfs(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SL_FS_ENTRIES; i++)
+ securityfs_remove(fs_entries[i]);
+
+ if (sl_flags & SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT) {
+ if (txt_heap) {
+ memunmap(txt_heap);
+ txt_heap = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sl_evtlog.addr = 0;
+ sl_evtlog.size = 0;
+}
+
+static void slaunch_intel_evtlog(void)
+{
+ void __iomem *config;
+ struct txt_os_mle_data *params;
+ void *os_sinit_data;
+ u64 base, size;
+
+ config = ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES *
+ PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (!config) {
+ pr_err("Error failed to ioremap TXT reqs\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ memcpy_fromio(&base, config + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE, sizeof(u64));
+ memcpy_fromio(&size, config + TXT_CR_HEAP_SIZE, sizeof(u64));
+ iounmap(config);
+
+ /* now map TXT heap */
+ txt_heap = memremap(base, size, MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!txt_heap) {
+ pr_err("Error failed to memremap TXT heap\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ params = (struct txt_os_mle_data *)txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap);
+
+ sl_evtlog.size = TXT_MAX_EVENT_LOG_SIZE;
+ sl_evtlog.addr = (void __iomem *)¶ms->event_log_buffer[0];
+
+ /* Determine if this is TPM 1.2 or 2.0 event log */
+ if (memcmp(sl_evtlog.addr + sizeof(struct tpm12_pcr_event),
+ TPM20_EVTLOG_SIGNATURE, sizeof(TPM20_EVTLOG_SIGNATURE)))
+ return; /* looks like it is not 2.0 */
+
+ /* For TPM 2.0 logs, the extended heap element must be located */
+ os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap);
+
+ evtlog20 = tpm20_find_log2_1_element(os_sinit_data);
+
+ /*
+ * If this fails, things are in really bad shape. Any attempt to write
+ * events to the log will fail.
+ */
+ if (!evtlog20)
+ pr_err("Error failed to find TPM20 event log element\n");
+}
+
+static int __init slaunch_late_init(void)
+{
+ /* Check to see if Secure Launch happened */
+ if (!(sl_flags & (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE|SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Only Intel TXT is supported at this point */
+ slaunch_intel_evtlog();
+
+ return slaunch_expose_securityfs();
+}
+
+static void __exit slaunch_exit(void)
+{
+ slaunch_teardown_securityfs();
+}
+
+late_initcall(slaunch_late_init);
+
+__exitcall(slaunch_exit);
--
2.25.1
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