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Message-Id: <20200326081847.5870-11-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 16:18:47 +0800
From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
pbonzini@...hat.com, sean.j.christopherson@...el.com,
jmattson@...gle.com
Cc: yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com, Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: [kvm-unit-tests PATCH] x86: Add tests for user-mode CET
This unit-test is intended to test user-mode CET support of KVM,
it's tested on Intel new platform. Two CET features: Shadow Stack
Protection(SHSTK) and Indirect-Branch Tracking(IBT) are enclosed.
In SHSTK test, if the function return-address in normal stack is
tampered with a value not equal to the one on shadow-stack, #CP
(Control Protection Exception)will generated on function returning.
This feature is supported by processor itself, no compiler/link
option is required.
However, to enabled IBT, we need to add -fcf-protection=full in
compiler options, this makes the compiler insert endbr64 at the
very beginning of each jmp/call target given the binary is for
x86_64.
To get PASS results, the following conditions must be met:
1) The processor is powered with CET feature.
2) The kernel is patched with the latest CET kernel patches.
3) The KVM and QEMU are patched with the latest CET patches.
4) Use CET-enabled gcc to compile the test app.
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
---
lib/x86/desc.c | 2 +
lib/x86/msr.h | 2 +
lib/x86/processor.h | 3 +
x86/Makefile.common | 3 +-
x86/Makefile.x86_64 | 3 +-
x86/cet.c | 212 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
x86/unittests.cfg | 6 ++
7 files changed, 229 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 x86/cet.c
diff --git a/lib/x86/desc.c b/lib/x86/desc.c
index 451f504..983d4d8 100644
--- a/lib/x86/desc.c
+++ b/lib/x86/desc.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ EX(mf, 16);
EX_E(ac, 17);
EX(mc, 18);
EX(xm, 19);
+EX_E(cp, 21);
asm (".pushsection .text \n\t"
"__handle_exception: \n\t"
@@ -224,6 +225,7 @@ static void *idt_handlers[32] = {
[17] = &ac_fault,
[18] = &mc_fault,
[19] = &xm_fault,
+ [21] = &cp_fault,
};
void setup_idt(void)
diff --git a/lib/x86/msr.h b/lib/x86/msr.h
index 8dca964..98489e0 100644
--- a/lib/x86/msr.h
+++ b/lib/x86/msr.h
@@ -208,6 +208,8 @@
#define MSR_IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON 0x0000002a
#define MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL 0x0000003a
#define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b
+#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x000006a0
+#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x000006a7
#define FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED (1<<0)
#define FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX (1<<1)
diff --git a/lib/x86/processor.h b/lib/x86/processor.h
index 03fdf64..5763d62 100644
--- a/lib/x86/processor.h
+++ b/lib/x86/processor.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#define X86_CR4_SMEP 0x00100000
#define X86_CR4_SMAP 0x00200000
#define X86_CR4_PKE 0x00400000
+#define X86_CR4_CET 0x00800000
#define X86_EFLAGS_CF 0x00000001
#define X86_EFLAGS_FIXED 0x00000002
@@ -149,8 +150,10 @@ static inline u8 cpuid_maxphyaddr(void)
#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (CPUID(0x7, 0, ECX, 3))
#define X86_FEATURE_LA57 (CPUID(0x7, 0, ECX, 16))
#define X86_FEATURE_RDPID (CPUID(0x7, 0, ECX, 22))
+#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK (CPUID(0x7, 0, ECX, 7))
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (CPUID(0x7, 0, EDX, 26))
#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (CPUID(0x7, 0, EDX, 29))
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBT (CPUID(0x7, 0, EDX, 20))
#define X86_FEATURE_NX (CPUID(0x80000001, 0, EDX, 20))
#define X86_FEATURE_RDPRU (CPUID(0x80000008, 0, EBX, 4))
diff --git a/x86/Makefile.common b/x86/Makefile.common
index ab67ca0..c5b4d2c 100644
--- a/x86/Makefile.common
+++ b/x86/Makefile.common
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ tests-common = $(TEST_DIR)/vmexit.flat $(TEST_DIR)/tsc.flat \
$(TEST_DIR)/init.flat $(TEST_DIR)/smap.flat \
$(TEST_DIR)/hyperv_synic.flat $(TEST_DIR)/hyperv_stimer.flat \
$(TEST_DIR)/hyperv_connections.flat \
- $(TEST_DIR)/umip.flat $(TEST_DIR)/tsx-ctrl.flat
+ $(TEST_DIR)/umip.flat $(TEST_DIR)/tsx-ctrl.flat \
+ $(TEST_DIR)/cet.flat
test_cases: $(tests-common) $(tests)
diff --git a/x86/Makefile.x86_64 b/x86/Makefile.x86_64
index 010102b..43d9706 100644
--- a/x86/Makefile.x86_64
+++ b/x86/Makefile.x86_64
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
cstart.o = $(TEST_DIR)/cstart64.o
bits = 64
ldarch = elf64-x86-64
-COMMON_CFLAGS += -mno-red-zone -mno-sse -mno-sse2
+COMMON_CFLAGS += -mno-red-zone -mno-sse -mno-sse2 -fcf-protection=full
cflatobjs += lib/x86/setjmp64.o
cflatobjs += lib/x86/intel-iommu.o
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ tests += $(TEST_DIR)/tscdeadline_latency.flat
tests += $(TEST_DIR)/intel-iommu.flat
tests += $(TEST_DIR)/vmware_backdoors.flat
tests += $(TEST_DIR)/rdpru.flat
+tests += $(TEST_DIR)/cet.flat
include $(SRCDIR)/$(TEST_DIR)/Makefile.common
diff --git a/x86/cet.c b/x86/cet.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0045ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x86/cet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+
+#include "libcflat.h"
+#include "x86/desc.h"
+#include "x86/processor.h"
+#include "x86/vm.h"
+#include "x86/msr.h"
+#include "vmalloc.h"
+#include "alloc_page.h"
+#include "fault_test.h"
+
+#define TEST_ARG(a, b, c, m, sf) {.usermode = m, \
+ .func = (test_fault_func) NULL, \
+ .fault_vector = 21, .should_fault = sf, .arg = {a, b, c, 0}, \
+ .callback = NULL}
+
+#define CET_TEST(name, a, b, c, m, sf) FAULT_TEST(name, \
+ TEST_ARG(a, b, c, m, sf))
+static unsigned long rbx, rsi, rdi, rsp, rbp, r8, r9,
+ r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15;
+
+struct fault_test cet_tests[] = {
+ CET_TEST("CET SHSTK", 0, 0, 0, true, true),
+ CET_TEST("CET IBT", 0, 0, 0, true, true),
+ { NULL },
+};
+
+struct fault_test *arg_user;
+static unsigned long expected_rip;
+static int cp_count;
+
+static u64 cet_shstk_func(u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 arg3, u64 arg4)
+{
+ unsigned long *ret_addr, *ssp;
+
+ asm volatile ("rdsspq %0" : "=r"(ssp));
+ asm("movq %%rbp,%0" : "=r"(ret_addr));
+ printf("The return-address in shadow-stack = 0x%lx, in normal stack = 0x%lx\n",
+ *ssp, *(ret_addr + 1));
+
+ /*
+ * In below line, it modifies the return address, it'll trigger #CP
+ * while function is returning. The error-code is 0x1, meaning it's
+ * caused by a near RET instruction, and the execution is terminated
+ * when HW detects the violation.
+ */
+ printf("Try to temper the return-address, this causes #CP on returning...\n");
+ *(ret_addr + 1) = 0xdeaddead;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u64 cet_ibt_func(u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 arg3, u64 arg4)
+{
+ /*
+ * In below assembly code, the first instruction at lable 2 is not
+ * endbr64, it'll trigger #CP with error code 0x3, and the execution
+ * is terminated when HW detects the violation.
+ */
+ printf("No endbr64 instruction at jmp target, this triggers #CP...\n");
+ asm volatile ("movq $2, %rcx\n"
+ "dec %rcx\n"
+ "leaq 2f, %rax\n"
+ "jmp %rax \n"
+ "2:\n"
+ "dec %rcx\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void do_cp_tss(unsigned long error_code);
+void do_cp_tss(unsigned long error_code)
+{
+ cp_count++;
+ printf("In #CP exception handler, error_code = 0x%lx\n", error_code);
+ asm("jmp %0" :: "m"(expected_rip));
+}
+
+extern void cp_tss(void);
+asm ("cp_tss: \t\n"
+ "push %rax; push %rcx; push %rdx; push %rsi; push %rdi\n"
+ "push %r8; push %r9; push %r10; push %r11\n"
+ "mov 9*8(%rsp),%rdi\n"
+ "call do_cp_tss \t\n"
+ "pop %r11;pop %r10; pop %r9; pop %r8\n"
+ "pop %rdi; pop %rsi; pop %rdx; pop %rcx; pop %rax\n"
+ "add $8, %rsp\t\n"
+ "iretq \t\n"
+ "jmp cp_tss");
+
+#define SAVE_REGS() \
+ asm ("movq %%rbx, %0\t\n" \
+ "movq %%rsi, %1\t\n" \
+ "movq %%rdi, %2\t\n" \
+ "movq %%rsp, %3\t\n" \
+ "movq %%rbp, %4\t\n" \
+ "movq %%r8, %5\t\n" \
+ "movq %%r9, %6\t\n" \
+ "movq %%r10, %7\t\n" \
+ "movq %%r11, %8\t\n" \
+ "movq %%r12, %9\t\n" \
+ "movq %%r13, %10\t\n" \
+ "movq %%r14, %11\t\n" \
+ "movq %%r15, %12\t\n" :: \
+ "m"(rbx), "m"(rsi), "m"(rdi), "m"(rsp), "m"(rbp), \
+ "m"(r8), "m"(r9), "m"(r10), "m"(r11), "m"(r12), \
+ "m"(r13), "m"(r14), "m"(r15));
+
+#define RESTOR_REGS() \
+ asm ("movq %0, %%rbx\t\n" \
+ "movq %1, %%rsi\t\n" \
+ "movq %2, %%rdi\t\n" \
+ "movq %3, %%rsp\t\n" \
+ "movq %4, %%rbp\t\n" \
+ "movq %5, %%r8\t\n" \
+ "movq %6, %%r9\t\n" \
+ "movq %7, %%r10\t\n" \
+ "movq %8, %%r11\t\n" \
+ "movq %9, %%r12\t\n" \
+ "movq %10, %%r13\t\n" \
+ "movq %11, %%r14\t\n" \
+ "movq %12, %%r15\t\n" ::\
+ "m"(rbx), "m"(rsi), "m"(rdi), "m"(rsp), "m"(rbp), \
+ "m"(r8), "m"(r9), "m"(r10), "m"(r11), "m"(r12), \
+ "m"(r13), "m"(r14), "m"(r15));
+
+#define RUN_TEST() \
+ do { \
+ SAVE_REGS(); \
+ asm volatile ("movq %0, %%rdi\t\n" \
+ "pushq %%rax\t\n" \
+ "leaq 1f(%%rip), %%rax\t\n" \
+ "movq %%rax, %1\t\n" \
+ "popq %%rax\t\n" \
+ "call test_run\t\n" \
+ "1:" :: "r"(arg_user), "m"(expected_rip) : "rax", "rdi"); \
+ RESTOR_REGS(); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define ENABLE_SHSTK_BIT 0x1
+#define ENABLE_IBT_BIT 0x4
+
+int main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ char *shstk_virt;
+ unsigned long shstk_phys;
+ unsigned long *ptep;
+ pteval_t pte = 0;
+
+ cp_count = 0;
+ if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+ printf("SHSTK not enabled\n");
+ return report_summary();
+ }
+
+ if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
+ printf("IBT not enabled\n");
+ return report_summary();
+ }
+
+ setup_vm();
+ setup_idt();
+ setup_alt_stack();
+ set_intr_alt_stack(21, cp_tss);
+
+ /* Allocate one page for shadow-stack. */
+ shstk_virt = alloc_vpage();
+ shstk_phys = (unsigned long)virt_to_phys(alloc_page());
+
+ /* Install the new page. */
+ pte = shstk_phys | PT_PRESENT_MASK | PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK;
+ install_pte(current_page_table(), 1, shstk_virt, pte, 0);
+ memset(shstk_virt, 0x0, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /* Mark it as shadow-stack page. */
+ ptep = get_pte_level(current_page_table(), shstk_virt, 1);
+ *ptep &= ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
+ *ptep |= PT_DIRTY_MASK;
+
+ /* Flush the paging cache. */
+ invlpg((void *)shstk_phys);
+
+ /* Enable shadow-stack protection */
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_U_CET, ENABLE_SHSTK_BIT);
+
+ /* Store shadow-stack pointer. */
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, (u64)(shstk_virt + 0x1000));
+
+ /* Enable CET master control bit in CR4. */
+ write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_CET);
+
+ /* Do user-mode shadow-stack protection test.*/
+ cet_tests[0].arg.func = cet_shstk_func;
+ arg_user = &cet_tests[0];
+
+ RUN_TEST();
+ report(cp_count == 1, "Completed shadow-stack protection test successfully.");
+ cp_count = 0;
+
+ /* Do user-mode indirect-branch-tracking test.*/
+ cet_tests[1].arg.func = cet_ibt_func;
+ arg_user = &cet_tests[1];
+
+ /* Enable indirect-branch tracking */
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_U_CET, ENABLE_IBT_BIT);
+
+ RUN_TEST();
+ report(cp_count == 1, "Completed Indirect-branch tracking test successfully.");
+
+ write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_CET);
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0);
+
+ return report_summary();
+}
diff --git a/x86/unittests.cfg b/x86/unittests.cfg
index f2401eb..87d412f 100644
--- a/x86/unittests.cfg
+++ b/x86/unittests.cfg
@@ -346,3 +346,9 @@ extra_params = -M q35,kernel-irqchip=split -device intel-iommu,intremap=on,eim=o
file = tsx-ctrl.flat
extra_params = -cpu host
groups = tsx-ctrl
+
+[intel_cet]
+file = cet.flat
+arch = x86_64
+smp = 2
+extra_params = -enable-kvm -m 2048 -cpu host
--
2.17.2
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