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Message-ID: <7923d2289ec044579a3eb00ca339a018@AcuMS.aculab.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 09:27:17 +0000
From: David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
To: "'Theodore Y. Ts'o'" <tytso@....edu>, George Spelvin <lkml@....ORG>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Qian Cai <cai@....pw>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linux MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH v1 00/52] Audit kernel random number use
From: Theodore Y. Ts'o
> Sent: 29 March 2020 22:42
> On Sun, Mar 29, 2020 at 05:41:22PM +0000, George Spelvin wrote:
> > > Using xor was particularly stupid.
> > > The whole generator was then linear and trivially reversable.
> > > Just using addition would have made it much stronger.
> >
> > I considered changing it to addition (actually, add pairs and XOR the
> > sums), but that would break its self-test. And once I'd done that,
> > there are much better possibilities.
> >
> > Actually, addition doesn't make it *much* stronger. To start
> > with, addition and xor are the same thing at the lsbit, so
> > observing 113 lsbits gives you a linear decoding problem.
>
> David,
>
> If anyone is trying to rely on prandom_u32() as being "strong" in any
> sense of the word in terms of being reversable by attacker --- they
> shouldn't be using prandom_u32(). That's going to be true no matter
> *what* algorithm we use.
Indeed, but xor merging of 4 LFSR gives an appearance of an
improvements (over a single LFSR) but gives none and just
increases the complexity.
David
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