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Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2020 23:56:33 +0000
From: "Singh, Balbir" <sblbir@...zon.com>
To: "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC: "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
"tony.luck@...el.com" <tony.luck@...el.com>,
"benh@...nel.crashing.org" <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"dave.hansen@...el.com" <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/4] arch/x86: Optionally flush L1D on context switch
On Tue, 2020-03-31 at 20:34 +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>
> Balbir Singh <sblbir@...zon.com> writes:
>
> > This patch implements a mechanisn to selectively flush the L1D cache.
>
> git grep 'This patch' Documentation/process/
>
I'll get more imperative, thanks!
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> > b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> > index 6f66d841262d..1d535059b358 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> > @@ -219,6 +219,12 @@ struct tlb_state {
> > */
> > unsigned long cr4;
> >
> > + /*
> > + * Flush the L1D cache on switch_mm_irqs_off() for a
> > + * task getting off the CPU, if it opted in to do so
> > + */
> > + bool last_user_mm_l1d_flush;
>
> ...
>
> > +/*
> > + * Flush the L1D cache for this CPU. We want to this at switch mm time,
> > + * this is a pessimistic security measure and an opt-in for those tasks
> > + * that host sensitive information and there are concerns about spills
> > + * from fill buffers.
>
> Color me confused, but how is L1D flush mitigating fill buffer spills
> (MFBDS)? The MDS family is mitigated by MD_CLEAR, i.e VERW.
I should reword that sentence to say snoop from L1D
>
> > + */
> > +static void l1d_flush(struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > + struct mm_struct *real_prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * If we are not really switching mm's, we can just return
> > + */
> > + if (real_prev == next)
> > + return;
>
> Instead of having the same check here, please stick the call into the
> corresponding path in switch_mm_irqs_off(), i.e. where we already have
> the cond_ibpb() invocation.
>
Sure, will do
> > + /*
> > + * Do we need flushing for by the previous task
>
> for by? Perhaps:
I'll fix that comment up
>
> Did the previous task request L1D flush when it scheduled in?
>
> > + */
> > + if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_l1d_flush) != 0) {
>
> This is a bool, so != 0 is pointless.
>
> > + if (!flush_l1d_cache_hw())
> > + flush_l1d_cache_sw(l1d_flush_pages);
> > + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_l1d_flush, 0);
>
> s/0/false/
>
Will do
> > + /* Make sure we clear the values before we set it again */
> > + barrier();
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (tsk == NULL)
> > + return;
> > +
> > + /* We don't need stringent checks as we opt-in/opt-out */
> > + if (test_ti_thread_flag(&tsk->thread_info, TIF_L1D_FLUSH))
> > + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_l1d_flush, 1);
>
> s/1/true/
>
> That aside looking at the gazillion of conditionals here. That's 4 in
> the worst case. So how about extending cond_ibpb() like the below?
>
> Thanks,
>
> tglx
>
Makes sense, it mostly looks good! Let me refactor the comments and code.
Balbir
> 8<---------------------
>
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct thread_info {
> #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */
> #define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */
> #define TIF_SPEC_IB 9 /* Indirect branch speculation
> mitigation */
> -#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE 10 /* Force speculation MSR update in
> context switch */
> +#define TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D 10 /* L1D Flush in switch_mm() */
> #define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY 11 /* notify kernel of userspace return
> */
> #define TIF_UPROBE 12 /* breakpointed or singlestepping */
> #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 13 /* pending live patching update */
> @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ struct thread_info {
> #define TIF_MEMDIE 20 /* is terminating due to OOM killer
> */
> #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG 21 /* idle is polling for
> TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
> #define TIF_IO_BITMAP 22 /* uses I/O bitmap */
> +#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE 23 /* Force speculation MSR update in
> context switch */
> #define TIF_FORCED_TF 24 /* true if TF in eflags artificially
> */
> #define TIF_BLOCKSTEP 25 /* set when we want DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF
> */
> #define TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES 27 /* task is updating the mmu lazily
> */
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ struct tlb_state {
> /* Last user mm for optimizing IBPB */
> union {
> struct mm_struct *last_user_mm;
> - unsigned long last_user_mm_ibpb;
> + unsigned long last_user_mm_spec;
> };
>
> u16 loaded_mm_asid;
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
> @@ -33,10 +33,13 @@
> */
>
> /*
> - * Use bit 0 to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is
> - * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_ibpb.
> + * Bits mangle the TIF_SPEC_* state into the mm pointer which is
> + * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_spec.
> */
> #define LAST_USER_MM_IBPB 0x1UL
> +#define LAST_USER_MM_FLUSH_L1D 0x2UL
> +
> +#define LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK (LAST_USER_MM_IBPB | LAST_USER_MM_FLUSH_L1D)
>
> /*
> * We get here when we do something requiring a TLB invalidation
> @@ -189,18 +192,22 @@ static void sync_current_stack_to_mm(str
> }
> }
>
> -static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(struct task_struct *next)
> +static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec(struct task_struct *next)
> {
> unsigned long next_tif = task_thread_info(next)->flags;
> - unsigned long ibpb = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB;
> + unsigned long bits = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) &
> LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK;
> +
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D != TIF_SPEC_IB + 1);
>
> - return (unsigned long)next->mm | ibpb;
> + return (unsigned long)next->mm | bits;
> }
>
> -static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next)
> +static void cond_mitigations(struct task_struct *next)
> {
> - if (!next || !next->mm)
> - return;
> + unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm;
> +
> + prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec);
> + next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec(next);
>
> /*
> * Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm
> @@ -212,8 +219,6 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct
> * exposed data is not really interesting.
> */
> if (static_branch_likely(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb)) {
> - unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm;
> -
> /*
> * This is a bit more complex than the always mode because
> * it has to handle two cases:
> @@ -243,20 +248,14 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct
> * Optimize this with reasonably small overhead for the
> * above cases. Mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into the mm
> * pointer of the incoming task which is stored in
> - * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb for comparison.
> - */
> - next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(next);
> - prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb);
> -
> - /*
> + * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec for comparison.
> + *
> * Issue IBPB only if the mm's are different and one or
> * both have the IBPB bit set.
> */
> if (next_mm != prev_mm &&
> (next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB)
> indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
> -
> - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, next_mm);
> }
>
> if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb)) {
> @@ -265,11 +264,15 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct
> * different context than the user space task which ran
> * last on this CPU.
> */
> - if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm) != next->mm) {
> + if ((prev_mm & ~LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK) !=
> + (unsigned long)next->mm)
> indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
> - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm, next->mm);
> - }
> }
> +
> + if (prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_FLUSH_L1D)
> + flush_l1d();
> +
> + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec, next_mm);
> }
>
> void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
> @@ -371,11 +374,10 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct
> need_flush = true;
> } else {
> /*
> - * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch
> - * predictor when switching between processes. This stops
> - * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
> + * Speculation vulnerability mitigations when switching
> + * to a different user space process.
> */
> - cond_ibpb(tsk);
> + cond_mitigations(tsk);
>
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
> /*
> @@ -501,7 +503,7 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void)
> write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0));
>
> /* Reinitialize tlbstate. */
> - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, LAST_USER_MM_IBPB);
> + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec,
> LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK);
> this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, 0);
> this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1);
> this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id);
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