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Message-Id: <83ee0c2ed66c1acdc1385514f5aeaba8cd124beb.1585644000.git.lkml@sdf.org>
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2020 08:57:00 GMT
From: George Spelvin <lkml@....org>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Yangtao Li <tiny.windzz@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, lkml@....org
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] random: use better approximation in calc_entropy_frac()
Rather than a linear approximation to 1-exp(-x) which has 25% error for
small x (the common case), this uses a quadratic approximation which is
best for small x.
Both compute the same approximation 0.375 (-4.7% error) at x=0.5, the
high end of the input range.
If the processor supports it, a 32x32->64-bit multiply is used for greater
accuracy. If not, an intermediate normalizing shift is added to ensure
the product fits into 32 bits.
This also allows ENTROPY_SHIFT to be increased to 4, tracking entropy
in 1/16 bit increments.
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin <lkml@....org>
---
There's a lot of estimated entropy wasted by inaccurate accounting whwn
we add it in small increments. This improves that.
drivers/char/random.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index de90bab5af36..b10962861c5e 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/uuid.h>
+#include <linux/math64.h>
#include <crypto/chacha.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -363,13 +364,16 @@
/*
* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
- * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
+ * denominated in units of 1/16 bits.
*
- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in
- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
+ * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 32, or the code in
+ * entropy_frac_add() must be adjusted to use a larger first multiply.
*/
-#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
+#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 4
#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
+#if INPUT_POOL_SHIFT + ENTROPY_SHIFT > 16
+#error Those parameters are not going to work.
+#endif
/*
* If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
@@ -662,12 +666,34 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(void)
* entropy += (capacity - entropy) * (1 - exp(-add/capacity))
*
* To avoid evaluating an exponential in interrupt context, we use a
- * simple fixed-point underestimate.
+ * simple fixed-point underestimate for 1 - exp(-x). A second-order
+ * Taylor approximation works well: x * (1 - x/2) <= 1 - exp(-x)
*
- * For add <= capacity/2 then
- * (1 - exp(-add/capacity)) >= (add/capacity)*0.7869...
- * so we can approximate the exponential with 3/4*add/capacity and still
- * be on the safe side by adding at most capacity/2 at a time.
+ * This approximation is excellent for small x:
+ * x = 0.1 -> 0.17% low
+ * x = 0.2 -> 0.70% low
+ * x = 0.3 -> 1.61% low
+ * x = 0.4 -> 2.94% low
+ * x = 0.5 -> 4.69% low
+ * x = 1.0 -> 58.19% low
+ *
+ * It breaks (100% low) for x = 2.0, so in the rare case that add is
+ * large relative to capacity, we add the entropy a piece at a time.
+ * (We actually let the threshold equal half the pool size, but the
+ * exact value is not critical.)
+ *
+ * We are trying to compute
+ * (capacity - entropy) * (add/capacity) * (1 - add/capacity/2)
+ * using fixed-point, in fractional bits scaled by ENTROPY_SHIFT.
+ *
+ * For maximum accuracy, we'd do all the divisions last:
+ * (capacity - entropy) * add * (2*capacity - add) / (2*capacity^2)
+ * but at the maximum value of add = capacity/2, the intermediate
+ * product is almost capacity^3, which overflows 32 bits.
+ *
+ * If we are on a 64-bit processor OR have an arch-specific mul_u32_u32(),
+ * then use a 64-bit intermediate product. Otherwise, use a normalizing
+ * shift (the smallest possible) between the two multiplies.
*/
static int calc_entropy_frac(int add, int entropy,
struct entropy_store const *r)
@@ -679,13 +705,24 @@ static int calc_entropy_frac(int add, int entropy,
/* Debit */
entropy += add;
} else {
- const int s = info->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2;
- /* The +2 corresponds to the denominator of the 3/4 */
+ const int s = info->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT;
do {
unsigned int frac = min(add, capacity/2);
- unsigned int delta = ((capacity - entropy)*frac*3) >> s;
+ u32 delta = frac * (2*capacity - frac);
+#if defined(mul_u32_u32) || BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+ /* Use a 64-bit product */
+ delta = mul_u32_u32(delta, capacity - entropy) >>
+ (2*s + 1);
+#else
+ /* Use only 32-bit products */
+ const int s1 = max(3*s - 32, 0);
+
+ delta >>= s1;
+ delta *= capacity - entropy;
+ delta >>= 2*s + 1 - s1;
+#endif
entropy += delta;
add -= frac;
} while (unlikely(add) && entropy < capacity-2);
@@ -702,12 +739,12 @@ static int calc_entropy_frac(int add, int entropy,
*/
}
- if (WARN_ON(entropy < 0)) {
+ /* If out of range (should never happen), warn and clamp. */
+ if (WARN_ON(entropy < 0 || entropy > capacity)) {
pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n",
r->name, entropy);
- entropy = 0;
- } else if (unlikely(entropy > capacity))
- entropy = capacity;
+ entropy = entropy < 0 ? 0 : capacity;
+ }
return entropy;
}
--
2.26.0
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