linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v6 03/14] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND

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Message-ID: <4e9870fc-1cab-2058-b045-822ae5170e51@oracle.com>
Date:   Thu, 2 Apr 2020 13:15:51 -0700
From:   Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com>
To:     Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>, pbonzini@...hat.com
Cc:     tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com,
        joro@...tes.org, bp@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com,
        x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        rientjes@...gle.com, srutherford@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org,
        brijesh.singh@....com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 03/14] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command


On 3/29/20 11:20 PM, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@....com>
>
> The command is used to finailize the encryption context created with
> KVM_SEV_SEND_START command.
>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> Cc: x86@...nel.org
> Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
> ---
>   .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst        |  8 +++++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                            | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
>   2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> index f46817ef7019..a45dcb5f8687 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> @@ -314,6 +314,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
>                   __u32 trans_len;
>           };
>   
> +12. KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH
> +------------------------
> +
> +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command can be
> +issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context.
> +
> +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> +
>   References
>   ==========
>   
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 8561c47cc4f9..71a4cb3b817d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -7399,6 +7399,26 @@ static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>   	return ret;
>   }
>   
> +static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +	struct sev_data_send_finish *data;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +		return -ENOTTY;
> +
> +	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!data)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	data->handle = sev->handle;
> +	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, data, &argp->error);
> +
> +	kfree(data);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
>   static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>   {
>   	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
> @@ -7449,6 +7469,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>   	case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
>   		r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
>   		break;
> +	case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH:
> +		r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
> +		break;
>   	default:
>   		r = -EINVAL;
>   		goto out;
Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com>