linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/4] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access

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Message-ID: <20200403100257.GB25745@shell.armlinux.org.uk>
Date:   Fri, 3 Apr 2020 11:02:57 +0100
From:   Russell King - ARM Linux admin <linux@...linux.org.uk>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, airlied@...ux.ie,
        daniel@...ll.ch, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
        akpm@...ux-foundation.org, hpa@...or.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/4] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and
 user_write_access_begin/end

On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 11:35:57AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 06:50:32PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 07:03:28PM +0200, Christophe Leroy wrote:
> > 
> > > user_access_begin() grants both read and write.
> > > 
> > > This patch adds user_read_access_begin() and user_write_access_begin() but
> > > it doesn't remove user_access_begin()
> > 
> > Ouch...  So the most generic name is for the rarest case?
> >  
> > > > What should we do about that?  Do we prohibit such blocks outside
> > > > of arch?
> > > > 
> > > > What should we do about arm and s390?  There we want a cookie passed
> > > > from beginning of block to its end; should that be a return value?
> > > 
> > > That was the way I implemented it in January, see
> > > https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1227926/
> > > 
> > > There was some discussion around that and most noticeable was:
> > > 
> > > H. Peter (hpa) said about it: "I have *deep* concern with carrying state in
> > > a "key" variable: it's a direct attack vector for a crowbar attack,
> > > especially since it is by definition live inside a user access region."
> > 
> > > This patch minimises the change by just adding user_read_access_begin() and
> > > user_write_access_begin() keeping the same parameters as the existing
> > > user_access_begin().
> > 
> > Umm...  What about the arm situation?  The same concerns would apply there,
> > wouldn't they?  Currently we have
> > static __always_inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void)
> > {
> > #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN
> >         unsigned int old_domain = get_domain();
> > 
> >         /* Set the current domain access to permit user accesses */
> >         set_domain((old_domain & ~domain_mask(DOMAIN_USER)) |
> >                    domain_val(DOMAIN_USER, DOMAIN_CLIENT));
> > 
> >         return old_domain;
> > #else
> >         return 0;
> > #endif
> > }
> > and
> > static __always_inline void uaccess_restore(unsigned int flags)
> > {
> > #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN
> >         /* Restore the user access mask */
> >         set_domain(flags);
> > #endif
> > }
> > 
> > How much do we need nesting on those, anyway?  rmk?

It's that way because it's easy, logical, and actually *more* efficient
to do it that way, rather than read-modify-write the domain register
each time we want to change it.

> Yup, I think it's a weakness of the ARM implementation and I'd like to
> not extend it further. AFAIK we should never nest, but I would not be
> surprised at all if we did.

There is one known nesting, which is __clear_user() when used with
the (IMHO horrid and I don't care about) UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY feature.
That's not intentional however.

When I introduced this on ARM, the placement I adopted was to locate
it _as close as sanely possible_ to the userspace access so we
minimised the kernel accesses, so we minimise the number of accesses
that could go stray because of the domain issue - we ideally only
want the access done by the accessor itself to be affected, which
we achieve for most accesses.

Thinking laterally, maybe we should get rid of the whole KERNEL_DS
stuff entirely, and come up with an alternative way of handling the
kernel-wants-to-access-kernelspace-via-user-accessors problem.
Such as, copying some data back to userspace memory?

-- 
RMK's Patch system: https://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
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