linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 4/4] x86,module: Detect CRn and DRn manipulation

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Message-ID: <20200408154602.GA24869@infradead.org>
Date:   Wed, 8 Apr 2020 08:46:02 -0700
From:   Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, tglx@...utronix.de,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, hch@...radead.org,
        sean.j.christopherson@...el.com, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
        hpa@...or.com, x86@...nel.org, kenny@...ix.com, jeyu@...nel.org,
        rasmus.villemoes@...vas.dk, pbonzini@...hat.com,
        fenghua.yu@...el.com, xiaoyao.li@...el.com, nadav.amit@...il.com,
        thellstrom@...are.com, tony.luck@...el.com,
        gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, jannh@...gle.com,
        keescook@...omium.org, David.Laight@...lab.com,
        dcovelli@...are.com, mhiramat@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] x86,module: Detect CRn and DRn manipulation

On Wed, Apr 08, 2020 at 05:44:19PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 08, 2020 at 09:27:26AM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> > On Tue, 07 Apr 2020 13:02:40 +0200
> > Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
> 
> > > +		if (insn_is_mov_CRn(&insn) || insn_is_mov_DRn(&insn)) {
> > > +			pr_err("Module writes to CRn or DRn, please use the proper accessors: %s\n", mod->name);
> > > +			return -ENOEXEC;
> > > +		}
> > > +
> > 
> > Something like this should be done for all modules, not just out of tree
> > modules.
> 
> I'm all for it; but people were worried scanning all modules was too
> expensive (I don't really believe it is, module loading just can't be a
> hot-path). Also, in-tree modules are audited a lot more than out of tree
> magic voodoo crap.

Scanning all modules seems safer.  While we're at it - can be move the
kvm bits using VMX to be always in the core kernel and just forbid
modules from using those instructions entirely?