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Message-Id: <20200411231203.25933-23-sashal@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 11 Apr 2020 19:11:20 -0400
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 23/66] crypto: chelsio - Endianess bug in create_authenc_wr
From: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
[ Upstream commit ff462ddfd95b915345c3c7c037c3bfafdc58bae7 ]
kctx_len = (ntohl(KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V(aeadctx->key_ctx_hdr)) << 4)
- sizeof(chcr_req->key_ctx);
can't possibly be endian-safe. Look: ->key_ctx_hdr is __be32. And
KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V is "shift up by 24 bits". On little-endian hosts it
sees
b0 b1 b2 b3
in memory, inteprets that into b0 + (b1 << 8) + (b2 << 16) + (b3 << 24),
shifts up by 24, resulting in b0 << 24, does ntohl (byteswap on l-e),
gets b0 and shifts that up by 4. So we get b0 * 16 - sizeof(...).
Sounds reasonable, but on b-e we get
b3 + (b2 << 8) + (b1 << 16) + (b0 << 24), shift up by 24,
yielding b3 << 24, do ntohl (no-op on b-e) and then shift up by 4.
Resulting in b3 << 28 - sizeof(...), i.e. slightly under b3 * 256M.
Then we increase it some more and pass to alloc_skb() as size.
Somehow I doubt that we really want a quarter-gigabyte skb allocation
here...
Note that when you are building those values in
#define FILL_KEY_CTX_HDR(ck_size, mk_size, d_ck, opad, ctx_len) \
htonl(KEY_CONTEXT_VALID_V(1) | \
KEY_CONTEXT_CK_SIZE_V((ck_size)) | \
KEY_CONTEXT_MK_SIZE_V(mk_size) | \
KEY_CONTEXT_DUAL_CK_V((d_ck)) | \
KEY_CONTEXT_OPAD_PRESENT_V((opad)) | \
KEY_CONTEXT_SALT_PRESENT_V(1) | \
KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V((ctx_len)))
ctx_len ends up in the first octet (i.e. b0 in the above), which
matches the current behaviour on l-e. If that's the intent, this
thing should've been
kctx_len = (KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_G(ntohl(aeadctx->key_ctx_hdr)) << 4)
- sizeof(chcr_req->key_ctx);
instead - fetch after ntohl() we get (b0 << 24) + (b1 << 16) + (b2 << 8) + b3,
shift it down by 24 (b0), resuling in b0 * 16 - sizeof(...) both on l-e and
on b-e.
PS: when sparse warns you about endianness problems, it might be worth checking
if there really is something wrong. And I don't mean "slap __force cast on it"...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c
index c435f89f34e37..8b68ccc137c53 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c
@@ -2298,7 +2298,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *create_authenc_wr(struct aead_request *req,
dnents += MIN_AUTH_SG; // For IV
dst_size = get_space_for_phys_dsgl(dnents);
- kctx_len = (ntohl(KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_V(aeadctx->key_ctx_hdr)) << 4)
+ kctx_len = (KEY_CONTEXT_CTX_LEN_G(ntohl(aeadctx->key_ctx_hdr)) << 4)
- sizeof(chcr_req->key_ctx);
transhdr_len = CIPHER_TRANSHDR_SIZE(kctx_len, dst_size);
reqctx->imm = (transhdr_len + assoclen + IV + req->cryptlen) <
--
2.20.1
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