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Message-ID: <6dd04bc5-b0e8-6dbc-d4c5-9d19db5081dd@ghiti.fr>
Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2020 02:53:51 -0400
From: Alex Ghiti <alex@...ti.fr>
To: Zong Li <zong.li@...ive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
linux-riscv <linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org List" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 4/8] riscv/kaslr: randomize the kernel image offset
On 4/11/20 4:20 AM, Zong Li wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 10, 2020 at 11:58 PM Alex Ghiti <alex@...ti.fr> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Zong,
>>
>> On 4/9/20 6:31 AM, Zong Li wrote:
>>> On Thu, Apr 9, 2020 at 1:51 PM Alex Ghiti <alex@...ti.fr> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 4/7/20 6:53 AM, Zong Li wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 1:11 PM Alex Ghiti <alex@...ti.fr> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 3/24/20 3:30 AM, Zong Li wrote:
>>>>>>> Entropy is derived from the banner and timer, it is better than nothing
>>>>>>> but not enough secure, so previous stage may pass entropy via the device
>>>>>>> tree /chosen/kaslr-seed node.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We limit randomization range within 1GB, so we can exploit early page
>>>>>>> table to map new destination of kernel image. Additionally, the kernel
>>>>>>> offset need 2M alignment to ensure it's good in PMD page table.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We also checks the kernel offset whether it's safe by avoiding to
>>>>>>> overlaps with dtb, initrd and reserved memory regions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That maybe changes the way my sv48 patchset will be implemented: I can't
>>>>>> get user preference (3-level or 4-level) by any means, device-tree or
>>>>>> kernel parameter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But I don't see how you could get a random offset without info from the
>>>>>> device tree anyway (reserved memory regions especially), so maybe I
>>>>>> could parse dtb for allowing the user to choose. I'll move this
>>>>>> discussion to the sv48 introduction.
>>>>>
>>>>> Maybe I'm a little bit misunderstanding here, but I think I got the
>>>>> random offset through some information by parsing dtb.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I was just saying that I may use the dtb too in sv48 patchset to make it
>>>> possible for users to choose sv39 even if sv48 is supported by hardware
>>>> (which is not the case in my current patchset).
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Zong Li <zong.li@...ive.com>
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>> arch/riscv/kernel/kaslr.c | 274 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>>>>> arch/riscv/mm/init.c | 2 +-
>>>>>>> 2 files changed, 273 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/kaslr.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/kaslr.c
>>>>>>> index 281b5fcca5c8..9ec2b608eb7f 100644
>>>>>>> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/kaslr.c
>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/kaslr.c
>>>>>>> @@ -11,23 +11,293 @@
>>>>>>> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> extern char _start[], _end[];
>>>>>>> +extern void *dtb_early_va;
>>>>>>> +extern phys_addr_t dtb_early_pa;
>>>>>>> extern void secondary_random_target(void);
>>>>>>> extern void kaslr_create_page_table(uintptr_t start, uintptr_t end);
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> uintptr_t secondary_next_target __initdata;
>>>>>>> static uintptr_t kaslr_offset __initdata;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> +static const __init u32 *get_reg_address(int root_cells,
>>>>>>> + const u32 *value, u64 *result)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + int cell;
>>>>>>> + *result = 0;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + for (cell = root_cells; cell > 0; --cell)
>>>>>>> + *result = (*result << 32) + fdt32_to_cpu(*value++);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return value;
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +static __init int get_node_addr_size_cells(const char *path, int *addr_cell,
>>>>>>> + int *size_cell)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + int node = fdt_path_offset(dtb_early_va, path);
>>>>>>> + fdt64_t *prop;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (node < 0)
>>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + prop = fdt_getprop_w(dtb_early_va, node, "#address-cells", NULL);
>>>>>>> + if (!prop)
>>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>>>> + *addr_cell = fdt32_to_cpu(*prop);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + prop = fdt_getprop_w(dtb_early_va, node, "#size-cells", NULL);
>>>>>>> + if (!prop)
>>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>>>> + *size_cell = fdt32_to_cpu(*prop);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return node;
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +static __init void kaslr_get_mem_info(uintptr_t *mem_start,
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t *mem_size)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + int node, root, addr_cells, size_cells;
>>>>>>> + u64 base, size;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /* Get root node's address cells and size cells. */
>>>>>>> + root = get_node_addr_size_cells("/", &addr_cells, &size_cells);
>>>>>>> + if (root < 0)
>>>>>>> + return;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /* Get memory base address and size. */
>>>>>>> + fdt_for_each_subnode(node, dtb_early_va, root) {
>>>>>>> + const char *dev_type;
>>>>>>> + const u32 *reg;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + dev_type = fdt_getprop(dtb_early_va, node, "device_type", NULL);
>>>>>>> + if (!dev_type)
>>>>>>> + continue;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (!strcmp(dev_type, "memory")) {
>>>>>>> + reg = fdt_getprop(dtb_early_va, node, "reg", NULL);
>>>>>>> + if (!reg)
>>>>>>> + return;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + reg = get_reg_address(addr_cells, reg, &base);
>>>>>>> + reg = get_reg_address(size_cells, reg, &size);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + *mem_start = base;
>>>>>>> + *mem_size = size;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + break;
>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +/* Return a default seed if there is no HW generator. */
>>>>>>> +static u64 kaslr_default_seed = ULL(-1);
>>>>>>> +static __init u64 kaslr_get_seed(void)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + int node, len;
>>>>>>> + fdt64_t *prop;
>>>>>>> + u64 ret;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + node = fdt_path_offset(dtb_early_va, "/chosen");
>>>>>>> + if (node < 0)
>>>>>>> + return kaslr_default_seed++;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + prop = fdt_getprop_w(dtb_early_va, node, "kaslr-seed", &len);
>>>>>>> + if (!prop || len != sizeof(u64))
>>>>>>> + return kaslr_default_seed++;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + ret = fdt64_to_cpu(*prop);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /* Re-write to zero for checking whether get seed at second time */
>>>>>>> + *prop = 0;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return ret;
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +static __init bool is_overlap(uintptr_t s1, uintptr_t e1, uintptr_t s2,
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t e2)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + return e1 >= s2 && e2 >= s1;
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Inline this function or use a macro maybe.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, sure. Thanks.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +static __init bool is_overlap_reserved_mem(uintptr_t start_addr,
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t end_addr)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + int node, rsv_mem, addr_cells, size_cells;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /* Get the reserved-memory node. */
>>>>>>> + rsv_mem = get_node_addr_size_cells("/reserved-memory",
>>>>>>> + &addr_cells,
>>>>>>> + &size_cells);
>>>>>>> + if (rsv_mem < 0)
>>>>>>> + return false;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /* Get memory base address and size. */
>>>>>>> + fdt_for_each_subnode(node, dtb_early_va, rsv_mem) {
>>>>>>> + uint64_t base, size;
>>>>>>> + const uint32_t *reg;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + reg = fdt_getprop(dtb_early_va, node, "reg", NULL);
>>>>>>> + if (!reg)
>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + reg = get_reg_address(addr_cells, reg, &base);
>>>>>>> + reg = get_reg_address(size_cells, reg, &size);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (is_overlap(start_addr, end_addr, base, base + size))
>>>>>>> + return true;
>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return false;
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +static __init bool is_overlap_initrd(uintptr_t start_addr, uintptr_t end_addr)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + int node;
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t initrd_start, initrd_end;
>>>>>>> + fdt64_t *prop;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + node = fdt_path_offset(dtb_early_va, "/chosen");
>>>>>>> + if (node < 0)
>>>>>>> + return false;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + prop = fdt_getprop_w(dtb_early_va, node, "linux,initrd-start", NULL);
>>>>>>> + if (!prop)
>>>>>>> + return false;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + initrd_start = fdt64_to_cpu(*prop);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + prop = fdt_getprop_w(dtb_early_va, node, "linux,initrd-end", NULL);
>>>>>>> + if (!prop)
>>>>>>> + return false;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + initrd_end = fdt64_to_cpu(*prop);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return is_overlap(start_addr, end_addr, initrd_start, initrd_end);
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +static __init bool is_overlap_dtb(uintptr_t start_addr, uintptr_t end_addr)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t dtb_start = dtb_early_pa;
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t dtb_end = dtb_start + fdt_totalsize(dtb_early_va);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return is_overlap(start_addr, end_addr, dtb_start, dtb_end);
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +static __init bool has_regions_overlapping(uintptr_t start_addr,
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t end_addr)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + if (is_overlap_dtb(start_addr, end_addr))
>>>>>>> + return true;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (is_overlap_initrd(start_addr, end_addr))
>>>>>>> + return true;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (is_overlap_reserved_mem(start_addr, end_addr))
>>>>>>> + return true;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return false;
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +static inline __init unsigned long get_legal_offset(int random_index,
>>>>>>> + int max_index,
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t mem_start,
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t kernel_size)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t start_addr, end_addr;
>>>>>>> + int idx, stop_idx;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + idx = stop_idx = random_index;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + do {
>>>>>>> + start_addr = mem_start + idx * SZ_2M + kernel_size;
>>>>>>> + end_addr = start_addr + kernel_size;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /* Check overlap to other regions. */
>>>>>>> + if (!has_regions_overlapping(start_addr, end_addr))
>>>>>>> + return idx * SZ_2M + kernel_size;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (idx-- < 0)
>>>>>>> + idx = max_index;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Isn't the fallback to max_index a security breach ? Because at some
>>>>>> point, the kernel will be loaded at this specific address.
>>>>>
>>>>> The max_index is the maximum safe index for destination of new kernel
>>>>> image. Could you give more explain here?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But max_index is not random at all. I really don't know if that's a
>>>> problem, I just found intriguing the fact the kernel could be loaded at
>>>> some specific location. Would it be more secure, instead of picking
>>>> max_index as fallback when reaching 0, to pick another random number
>>>> between random_index and max_index ?
>>>
>>> ok, I can get your point. The original idea here is that we get a
>>> random index first, then we decrease the index to retry to find a good
>>> place if there are overlapping with other regions. A bit like the ring
>>> buffer, the end of index traversing is not zero, but the random_index
>>> - 1, we might consider it as continuity, so we don't know where is the
>>> end point because the start point is random, whether we stop at zero
>>> or random_index - 1.
>>>
>>> Pick another random number is more secure when occurring overlapping,
>>> but I a little bit worry that it would take very long time to retry
>>> many times in the worst case. for example, there is just only one
>>> index could fit kernel image in (except for original location). In the
>>> meantime, we don't need to wait the index being decreased to zero,
>>> because it seems to me that they are the same to stop at zero or
>>> random_index - 1, so if we decide to re-calculate a new random number,
>>> maybe we could remove the index decreasing here.
>>
>> But you're right that it could take some time before converging to a
>> "good" index. Maybe we could restrict the index range to indexes that we
>> know for sure will be good ?
>>
>
> Yes, it would be good for ensuring that we only need to get the random
> number just once, but there are some points need to be discussed. The
> first one is that we couldn't dynamically allocate a memory space at
> that moment, because the memblock is not ready, so we might need to
> declare a enough big array at static time to collect all good indexes.
> Maybe CONFIG_MAXPHYSMEM_2GB and CONFIG_MAXPHYSMEM_128GB could be used
> to decide the number of elements of this array. The second one is that
> we always need to take the time to traverse the whole memory and check
> the overlapping for all indexes no matter what the cases are. I'm not
> sure whether it is good because this way increases the time and space
> cost, but it would be more secure. Do you have any idea?
>
What about simply finding the biggest range of contiguous non-reserved
memory and getting an index from there ?
>
>> Alex
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Alex
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + } while (idx != stop_idx);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +static inline __init u64 rotate_xor(u64 hash, const void *area, size_t size)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + size_t i;
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t *ptr = (uintptr_t *) area;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + for (i = 0; i < size / sizeof(hash); i++) {
>>>>>>> + /* Rotate by odd number of bits and XOR. */
>>>>>>> + hash = (hash << ((sizeof(hash) * 8) - 7)) | (hash >> 7);
>>>>>>> + hash ^= ptr[i];
>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return hash;
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> +#define MEM_RESERVE_START __pa(PAGE_OFFSET)
>>>>>>> +static __init uintptr_t get_random_offset(u64 seed, uintptr_t kernel_size)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t mem_start = 0, mem_size= 0, random_size;
>>>>>>> + uintptr_t kernel_size_align = round_up(kernel_size, SZ_2M);
>>>>>>> + int index;
>>>>>>> + u64 random = 0;
>>>>>>> + cycles_t time_base;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /* Attempt to create a simple but unpredictable starting entropy */
>>>>>>> + random = rotate_xor(random, linux_banner, strlen(linux_banner));
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>> + * If there is no HW random number generator, use timer to get a random
>>>>>>> + * number. This is better than nothing but not enough secure.
>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>> + time_base = get_cycles() << 32;
>>>>>>> + time_base ^= get_cycles();
>>>>>>> + random = rotate_xor(random, &time_base, sizeof(time_base));
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (seed)
>>>>>>> + random = rotate_xor(random, &seed, sizeof(seed));
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + kaslr_get_mem_info(&mem_start, &mem_size);
>>>>>>> + if (!mem_size)
>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (mem_start < MEM_RESERVE_START) {
>>>>>>> + mem_size -= MEM_RESERVE_START - mem_start;
>>>>>>> + mem_start = MEM_RESERVE_START;
>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>> + * Limit randomization range within 1G, so we can exploit
>>>>>>> + * early_pmd/early_pte during early page table phase.
>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>> + random_size = min_t(u64,
>>>>>>> + mem_size - (kernel_size_align * 2),
>>>>>>> + SZ_1G - (kernel_size_align * 2));
>>>>>>
>>>>>> pgdir size is 30 bits in sv39, but it's 39 bits in sv48, you should use
>>>>>> PGDIR_SIZE macro here.
>>>>>
>>>>> OK, change it in the next version. Thanks.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /* The index of 2M block in whole avaliable region */
>>>>>>> + index = random % (random_size / SZ_2M);
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + return get_legal_offset(index, random_size / SZ_2M,
>>>>>>> + mem_start, kernel_size_align);
>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> uintptr_t __init kaslr_early_init(void)
>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>> + u64 seed;
>>>>>>> uintptr_t dest_start, dest_end;
>>>>>>> uintptr_t kernel_size = (uintptr_t) _end - (uintptr_t) _start;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> /* Get zero value at second time to avoid doing randomization again. */
>>>>>>> - if (kaslr_offset)
>>>>>>> + seed = kaslr_get_seed();
>>>>>>> + if (!seed)
>>>>>>> return 0;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> /* Get the random number for kaslr offset. */
>>>>>>> - kaslr_offset = 0x10000000;
>>>>>>> + kaslr_offset = get_random_offset(seed, kernel_size);
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> /* Update kernel_virt_addr for get_kaslr_offset. */
>>>>>>> kernel_virt_addr += kaslr_offset;
>>>>>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
>>>>>>> index 2f5b25f02b6c..34c6ecf2c599 100644
>>>>>>> --- a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
>>>>>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
>>>>>>> @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static void __init setup_initrd(void)
>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>> #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -static phys_addr_t dtb_early_pa __initdata;
>>>>>>> +phys_addr_t dtb_early_pa __initdata;
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> void __init setup_bootmem(void)
>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Alex
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