linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] powerpc/lib: Fixing use a temporary mm for code patching

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Message-ID: <3a37ab41-ab0e-6fae-9fbe-710f83a945f2@c-s.fr>
Date:   Sat, 18 Apr 2020 12:27:14 +0200
From:   Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>
To:     Christopher M Riedl <cmr@...ormatik.wtf>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] powerpc/lib: Fixing use a temporary mm for code
 patching



Le 15/04/2020 à 18:22, Christopher M Riedl a écrit :
>> On April 15, 2020 4:12 AM Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr> wrote:
>>
>>   
>> Le 15/04/2020 à 07:16, Christopher M Riedl a écrit :
>>>> On March 26, 2020 9:42 AM Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>    
>>>> This patch fixes the RFC series identified below.
>>>> It fixes three points:
>>>> - Failure with CONFIG_PPC_KUAP
>>>> - Failure to write do to lack of DIRTY bit set on the 8xx
>>>> - Inadequaly complex WARN post verification
>>>>
>>>> However, it has an impact on the CPU load. Here is the time
>>>> needed on an 8xx to run the ftrace selftests without and
>>>> with this series:
>>>> - Without CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX		==> 38 seconds
>>>> - With CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX			==> 40 seconds
>>>> - With CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX + this series	==> 43 seconds
>>>>
>>>> Link: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linuxppc-dev/list/?series=166003
>>>> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>
>>>> ---
>>>>    arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c | 5 ++++-
>>>>    1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c b/arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c
>>>> index f156132e8975..4ccff427592e 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c
>>>> @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ static int map_patch(const void *addr, struct patch_mapping *patch_mapping)
>>>>    	}
>>>>    
>>>>    	pte = mk_pte(page, pgprot);
>>>> +	pte = pte_mkdirty(pte);
>>>>    	set_pte_at(patching_mm, patching_addr, ptep, pte);
>>>>    
>>>>    	init_temp_mm(&patch_mapping->temp_mm, patching_mm);
>>>> @@ -168,7 +169,9 @@ static int do_patch_instruction(unsigned int *addr, unsigned int instr)
>>>>    			(offset_in_page((unsigned long)addr) /
>>>>    				sizeof(unsigned int));
>>>>    
>>>> +	allow_write_to_user(patch_addr, sizeof(instr));
>>>>    	__patch_instruction(addr, instr, patch_addr);
>>>> +	prevent_write_to_user(patch_addr, sizeof(instr));
>>>>
>>>
>>> On radix we can map the page with PAGE_KERNEL protection which ends up
>>> setting EAA[0] in the radix PTE. This means the KUAP (AMR) protection is
>>> ignored (ISA v3.0b Fig. 35) since we are accessing the page from MSR[PR]=0.
>>>
>>> Can we employ a similar approach on the 8xx? I would prefer *not* to wrap
>>> the __patch_instruction() with the allow_/prevent_write_to_user() KUAP things
>>> because this is a temporary kernel mapping which really isn't userspace in
>>> the usual sense.
>>
>> On the 8xx, that's pretty different.
>>
>> The PTE doesn't control whether a page is user page or a kernel page.
>> The only thing that is set in the PTE is whether a page is linked to a
>> given PID or not.
>> PAGE_KERNEL tells that the page can be addressed with any PID.
>>
>> The user access right is given by a kind of zone, which is in the PGD
>> entry. Every pages above PAGE_OFFSET are defined as belonging to zone 0.
>> Every pages below PAGE_OFFSET are defined as belonging to zone 1.
>>
>> By default, zone 0 can only be accessed by kernel, and zone 1 can only
>> be accessed by user. When kernel wants to access zone 1, it temporarily
>> changes properties of zone 1 to allow both kernel and user accesses.
>>
>> So, if your mapping is below PAGE_OFFSET, it is in zone 1 and kernel
>> must unlock it to access it.
>>
>>
>> And this is more or less the same on hash/32. This is managed by segment
>> registers. One segment register corresponds to a 256Mbytes area. Every
>> pages below PAGE_OFFSET can only be read by default by kernel. Only user
>> can write if the PTE allows it. When the kernel needs to write at an
>> address below PAGE_OFFSET, it must change the segment properties in the
>> corresponding segment register.
>>
>> So, for both cases, if we want to have it local to a task while still
>> allowing kernel access, it means we have to define a new special area
>> between TASK_SIZE and PAGE_OFFSET which belongs to kernel zone.
>>
>> That looks complex to me for a small benefit, especially as 8xx is not
>> SMP and neither are most of the hash/32 targets.
>>
> 
> Agreed. So I guess the solution is to differentiate between radix/non-radix
> and use PAGE_SHARED for non-radix along with the KUAP functions when KUAP
> is enabled. Hmm, I need to think about this some more, especially if it's
> acceptable to temporarily map kernel text as PAGE_SHARED for patching. Do
> you see any obvious problems on 8xx and hash/32 w/ using PAGE_SHARED?

No it shouldn't be a problem AFAICS, except maybe the CPU overhead it 
brings as I mentioned previously (ftrace selftests going from 40 to 43 
seconds ie 8% overhead.

> 
> I don't necessarily want to drop the local mm patching idea for non-radix
> platforms since that means we would have to maintain two implementations.
> 

What's the problem with RADIX, why can't PAGE_SHARED be used on radix ?

Christophe