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Message-ID: <00b0ea7c94e298e12bc3bfcc1c780dc78056c463.camel@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Mon, 20 Apr 2020 10:59:50 -0700
From:   Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        hpa@...or.com, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>, arjan@...ux.intel.com,
        X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 9/9] module: Reorder functions

On Mon, 2020-04-20 at 10:56 -0700, Kristen Carlson Accardi wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-04-20 at 14:01 +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Wed, 15 Apr 2020 at 23:07, Kristen Carlson Accardi
> > <kristen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> > > If a module has functions split out into separate text sections
> > > (i.e. compiled with the -ffunction-sections flag), reorder the
> > > functions to provide some code diversification to modules.
> > > 
> > 
> > Is that the only prerequisite? I.e., is it sufficient for another
> > architecture to add -ffunction-sections to the module CFLAGS to get
> > this functionality? (assuming it defines CONFIG_FG_KASLR=y)
> 
> I think it would work for modules. I've not tested this of course. It
> might not make sense for some architectures (like 32 bit), but it
> would
> probably work.
> 
> > > Signed-off-by: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>
> > > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> > > ---
> > >  kernel/module.c | 82
> > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > >  1 file changed, 82 insertions(+)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
> > > index 646f1e2330d2..e432ec5f6df4 100644
> > > --- a/kernel/module.c
> > > +++ b/kernel/module.c
> > > @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
> > >  #include <linux/bsearch.h>
> > >  #include <linux/dynamic_debug.h>
> > >  #include <linux/audit.h>
> > > +#include <linux/random.h>
> > > +#include <asm/setup.h>
> > >  #include <uapi/linux/module.h>
> > >  #include "module-internal.h"
> > > 
> > > @@ -2370,6 +2372,83 @@ static long get_offset(struct module *mod,
> > > unsigned int *size,
> > >         return ret;
> > >  }
> > > 
> > > +/*
> > > + * shuffle_text_list()
> > > + * Use a Fisher Yates algorithm to shuffle a list of text
> > > sections.
> > > + */
> > > +static void shuffle_text_list(Elf_Shdr **list, int size)
> > > +{
> > > +       int i;
> > > +       unsigned int j;
> > > +       Elf_Shdr *temp;
> > > +
> > > +       for (i = size - 1; i > 0; i--) {
> > > +               /*
> > > +                * pick a random index from 0 to i
> > > +                */
> > > +               get_random_bytes(&j, sizeof(j));
> > > +               j = j % (i + 1);
> > > +
> > > +               temp = list[i];
> > > +               list[i] = list[j];
> > > +               list[j] = temp;
> > > +       }
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * randomize_text()
> > > + * Look through the core section looking for executable code
> > > sections.
> > > + * Store sections in an array and then shuffle the sections
> > > + * to reorder the functions.
> > > + */
> > > +static void randomize_text(struct module *mod, struct load_info
> > > *info)
> > > +{
> > > +       int i;
> > > +       int num_text_sections = 0;
> > > +       Elf_Shdr **text_list;
> > > +       int size = 0;
> > > +       int max_sections = info->hdr->e_shnum;
> > > +       unsigned int sec = find_sec(info, ".text");
> > > +
> > > +       if (sec == 0)
> > > +               return;
> > > +
> > > +       text_list = kmalloc_array(max_sections,
> > > sizeof(*text_list),
> > > GFP_KERNEL);
> > > +       if (text_list == NULL)
> > > +               return;
> > > +
> > > +       for (i = 0; i < max_sections; i++) {
> > > +               Elf_Shdr *shdr = &info->sechdrs[i];
> > > +               const char *sname = info->secstrings + shdr-
> > > > sh_name;
> > > +
> > > +               if (!(shdr->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC) ||
> > > +                   !(shdr->sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR) ||
> > > +                   strstarts(sname, ".init"))
> > > +                       continue;
> > > +
> > > +               text_list[num_text_sections] = shdr;
> > > +               num_text_sections++;
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > > +       shuffle_text_list(text_list, num_text_sections);
> > > +
> > > +       for (i = 0; i < num_text_sections; i++) {
> > > +               Elf_Shdr *shdr = text_list[i];
> > > +
> > > +               /*
> > > +                * get_offset has a section index for it's last
> > > +                * argument, that is only used by
> > > arch_mod_section_prepend(),
> > > +                * which is only defined by parisc. Since this
> > > this
> > > type
> > > +                * of randomization isn't supported on parisc, we
> > > can
> > > +                * safely pass in zero as the last argument, as
> > > it
> > > is
> > > +                * ignored.
> > > +                */
> > > +               shdr->sh_entsize = get_offset(mod, &size, shdr,
> > > 0);
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > > +       kfree(text_list);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > >  /* Lay out the SHF_ALLOC sections in a way not dissimilar to how
> > > ld
> > >     might -- code, read-only data, read-write data, small
> > > data.  Tally
> > >     sizes, and place the offsets into sh_entsize fields: high bit
> > > means it
> > > @@ -2460,6 +2539,9 @@ static void layout_sections(struct module
> > > *mod, struct load_info *info)
> > >                         break;
> > >                 }
> > >         }
> > > +
> > > +       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FG_KASLR) && kaslr_enabled())
> > 
> > kaslr_enabled() only exists [as a function] on x86
> 
> CONFIG_FG_KASLR is dependant on x86_64. If people really think there
> is
> value in having the module randomization not dependent on the kernel
> randomization it can be changed to a different config option - but I
> am
> not sure that there is a ton of value in the module randomization on
> it's own.

I should have added - thank you for pointing this out, I will fix it in
the next version. I was on a tangent about whether you should even use
this without the main kernel randomization :).


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