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Message-ID: <20200423182906.GL17824@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Thu, 23 Apr 2020 11:29:06 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To:     Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        pbonzini@...hat.com, jmattson@...gle.com,
        yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 8/9] KVM: VMX: Enable CET support for nested VM

On Thu, Mar 26, 2020 at 04:18:45PM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> CET MSRs pass through guests for performance consideration.
> Configure the MSRs to match L0/L1 settings so that nested VM
> is able to run with CET.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c |  6 ++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h | 14 ++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    |  1 +
>  4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> index e47eb7c0fbae..a71ef33de55f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> @@ -627,6 +627,41 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  	nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
>  					     MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
>  
> +	/* Pass CET MSRs to nested VM if L0 and L1 are set to pass-through. */
> +	if (!msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET))
> +		nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
> +					msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
> +					MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW);
> +
> +	if (!msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP))
> +		nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
> +					msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
> +					MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
> +
> +	if (!msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET))
> +		nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
> +					msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
> +					MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW);
> +
> +	if (!msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP))
> +		nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
> +					msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
> +					MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
> +
> +	if (!msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP))
> +		nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
> +					msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
> +					MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
> +
> +	if (!msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP))
> +		nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
> +					msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
> +					MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
> +
> +	if (!msr_write_intercepted_l01(vcpu, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB))
> +		nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(
> +					msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
> +					MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, MSR_TYPE_RW);

That's a lot of copy-paste.  Maybe add a helper to do the conditional l01
check and subsequent call to nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr()?  It's
still a lot of boilerplate, but it's at least a little better.  Not sure
what a good name would be.

	nested_vmx_update_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET,
					    msr_bitmap_l1, msr_bitmap_l0,
					    MSR_TYPE_RW);


>  	/*
>  	 * Checking the L0->L1 bitmap is trying to verify two things:
>  	 *
> @@ -6040,7 +6075,8 @@ void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 ept_caps)
>  	msrs->exit_ctls_high |=
>  		VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR |
>  		VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER |
> -		VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER | VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT;
> +		VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER | VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT |
> +		VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE;
>  
>  	/* We support free control of debug control saving. */
>  	msrs->exit_ctls_low &= ~VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
> @@ -6057,7 +6093,8 @@ void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 ept_caps)
>  #endif
>  		VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT;
>  	msrs->entry_ctls_high |=
> -		(VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
> +		(VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
> +		 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE);

This is wrong, the OR path is only for emulated stuff, I'm guessing you're
not planning on emulating CET :-)

And I think this needs to be conditional based on supported_xss?
 
>  	/* We support free control of debug control loading. */
>  	msrs->entry_ctls_low &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c
> index 53dfb401316d..82b82bebeee0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c
> @@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = {
>  	FIELD(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, guest_pending_dbg_exceptions),
>  	FIELD(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, guest_sysenter_esp),
>  	FIELD(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, guest_sysenter_eip),
> +	FIELD(GUEST_S_CET, guest_s_cet),
> +	FIELD(GUEST_SSP, guest_ssp),
> +	FIELD(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, guest_ssp_tbl),
>  	FIELD(HOST_CR0, host_cr0),
>  	FIELD(HOST_CR3, host_cr3),
>  	FIELD(HOST_CR4, host_cr4),
> @@ -153,5 +156,8 @@ const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = {
>  	FIELD(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, host_ia32_sysenter_eip),
>  	FIELD(HOST_RSP, host_rsp),
>  	FIELD(HOST_RIP, host_rip),
> +	FIELD(HOST_S_CET, host_s_cet),
> +	FIELD(HOST_SSP, host_ssp),
> +	FIELD(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, host_ssp_tbl),
>  };
>  const unsigned int nr_vmcs12_fields = ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h
> index d0c6df373f67..62b7be68f05c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h
> @@ -118,7 +118,13 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 {
>  	natural_width host_ia32_sysenter_eip;
>  	natural_width host_rsp;
>  	natural_width host_rip;
> -	natural_width paddingl[8]; /* room for future expansion */
> +	natural_width host_s_cet;
> +	natural_width host_ssp;
> +	natural_width host_ssp_tbl;
> +	natural_width guest_s_cet;
> +	natural_width guest_ssp;
> +	natural_width guest_ssp_tbl;
> +	natural_width paddingl[2]; /* room for future expansion */

Tangetial topic, it'd be helpful if FIELD and FIELD64 had compile-time
assertions similar to vmcs_read*() to verify the size of the vmcs12 field
is correct.  In other words, I don't feel like reviewing all of these :-).

>  	u32 pin_based_vm_exec_control;
>  	u32 cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
>  	u32 exception_bitmap;
> @@ -301,6 +307,12 @@ static inline void vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets(void)
>  	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_sysenter_eip, 656);
>  	CHECK_OFFSET(host_rsp, 664);
>  	CHECK_OFFSET(host_rip, 672);
> +	CHECK_OFFSET(host_s_cet, 680);
> +	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ssp, 688);
> +	CHECK_OFFSET(host_ssp_tbl, 696);
> +	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_s_cet, 704);
> +	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ssp, 712);
> +	CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ssp_tbl, 720);
>  	CHECK_OFFSET(pin_based_vm_exec_control, 744);
>  	CHECK_OFFSET(cpu_based_vm_exec_control, 748);
>  	CHECK_OFFSET(exception_bitmap, 752);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index a3d01014b9e7..c2e950d378bd 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -7153,6 +7153,7 @@ static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PKE,        ecx, feature_bit(PKU));
>  	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_UMIP,       ecx, feature_bit(UMIP));
>  	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_LA57,       ecx, feature_bit(LA57));
> +	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_CET,	      ecx, feature_bit(SHSTK));
>  
>  #undef cr4_fixed1_update
>  }
> -- 
> 2.17.2
> 

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