linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 09/22] KVM: x86: replace is_smm checks with kvm_x86_ops.smi

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Message-Id: <20200424172416.243870-10-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Date:   Fri, 24 Apr 2020 13:24:03 -0400
From:   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     wei.huang2@....com, cavery@...hat.com, vkuznets@...hat.com,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Oliver Upton <oupton@...gle.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 09/22] KVM: x86: replace is_smm checks with kvm_x86_ops.smi_allowed

Do not hardcode is_smm so that all the architectural conditions for
blocking SMIs are listed in a single place.  Well, in two places because
this introduces some code duplication between Intel and AMD.

This ensures that nested SVM obeys GIF in kvm_vcpu_has_events.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     | 6 +++---
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index cdee634e961d..01ee1c3be25b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3771,7 +3771,7 @@ static bool svm_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	return true;
+	return !is_smm(vcpu);
 }
 
 static int svm_pre_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index c98194f04b04..c33317bfc1cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7680,7 +7680,7 @@ static bool vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	/* we need a nested vmexit to enter SMM, postpone if run is pending */
 	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
 		return false;
-	return true;
+	return !is_smm(vcpu);
 }
 
 static int vmx_pre_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 8ebfebc807fd..e8469db6ccae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -7744,8 +7744,7 @@ static int inject_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (vcpu->arch.smi_pending && !is_smm(vcpu) &&
-	    kvm_x86_ops.smi_allowed(vcpu)) {
+	if (vcpu->arch.smi_pending && kvm_x86_ops.smi_allowed(vcpu)) {
 		vcpu->arch.smi_pending = false;
 		++vcpu->arch.smi_count;
 		enter_smm(vcpu);
@@ -10174,7 +10173,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_has_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return true;
 
 	if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu) ||
-	    (vcpu->arch.smi_pending && !is_smm(vcpu)))
+	    (vcpu->arch.smi_pending &&
+	     kvm_x86_ops.smi_allowed(vcpu)))
 		return true;
 
 	if (kvm_arch_interrupt_allowed(vcpu) &&
-- 
2.18.2