linux-kernel - [PATCH v2] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

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Message-Id: <20200427140822.18619-1-longman@redhat.com>
Date:   Mon, 27 Apr 2020 10:08:22 -0400
From:   Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
To:     Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Changbin Du <changbin.du@...il.com>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] mm/slub: Fix incorrect interpretation of s->offset

In a couple of places in the slub memory allocator, the code uses
"s->offset" as a check to see if the free pointer is put right after the
object. That check is no longer true with commit 3202fa62fb43 ("slub:
relocate freelist pointer to middle of object").

As a result, echoing "1" into the validate sysfs file, e.g. of dentry,
may cause a bunch of "Freepointer corrupt" error reports like the
following to appear with the system in panic afterwards.

[   38.579769] =============================================================================
[   38.580845] BUG dentry(666:pmcd.service) (Tainted: G    B): Freepointer corrupt
[   38.581948] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

To fix it, use the check "s->offset == s->inuse" in the new helper
function freeptr_after_object() instead. Also add another helper function
get_info_end() to return the end of info block (inuse + free pointer
if not overlapping with object).

Fixes: 3202fa62fb43 ("slub: relocate freelist pointer to middle of object")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
---
 mm/slub.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 0e736d66bb42..68f1b4b1c309 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -551,15 +551,29 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr,
 	metadata_access_disable();
 }
 
+static inline bool freeptr_after_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+	return s->offset == s->inuse;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
+ * not overlapping with object.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+	if (freeptr_after_object(s))
+		return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
+	else
+		return s->inuse;
+}
+
 static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
 	enum track_item alloc)
 {
 	struct track *p;
 
-	if (s->offset)
-		p = object + s->offset + sizeof(void *);
-	else
-		p = object + s->inuse;
+	p = object + get_info_end(s);
 
 	return p + alloc;
 }
@@ -693,10 +707,7 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
 		print_section(KERN_ERR, "Redzone ", p + s->object_size,
 			s->inuse - s->object_size);
 
-	if (s->offset)
-		off = s->offset + sizeof(void *);
-	else
-		off = s->inuse;
+	off = get_info_end(s);
 
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
 		off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
@@ -790,7 +801,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
  * object address
  * 	Bytes of the object to be managed.
  * 	If the freepointer may overlay the object then the free
- * 	pointer is the first word of the object.
+ *	pointer is at the middle of the object.
  *
  * 	Poisoning uses 0x6b (POISON_FREE) and the last byte is
  * 	0xa5 (POISON_END)
@@ -824,11 +835,7 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
 
 static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
 {
-	unsigned long off = s->inuse;	/* The end of info */
-
-	if (s->offset)
-		/* Freepointer is placed after the object. */
-		off += sizeof(void *);
+	unsigned long off = get_info_end(s);	/* The end of info */
 
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
 		/* We also have user information there */
@@ -915,7 +922,7 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
 		check_pad_bytes(s, page, p);
 	}
 
-	if (!s->offset && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
+	if (!freeptr_after_object(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE)
 		/*
 		 * Object and freepointer overlap. Cannot check
 		 * freepointer while object is allocated.
-- 
2.18.1