linux-kernel - Re: [GIT PULL] Please pull proc and exec work for 5.7-rc1

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Date:   Tue, 28 Apr 2020 23:53:08 +0200
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@...mail.de>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Please pull proc and exec work for 5.7-rc1

On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 11:37 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 2:06 PM Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
> > In execve:
> >
> >  - After the point of no return, but before we start waiting for the
> >    other threads to go away, finish calculating our post-execve creds
> >    and stash them somewhere in the task_struct or so.
> >  - Drop the cred_guard_mutex.
> >  - Wait for the other threads to die.
> >  - Take the cred_guard_mutex again.
> >  - Clear out the pointer in the task_struct.
> >  - Finish execve and install the new creds.
> >  - Drop the cred_guard_mutex again.
> >
> > Then in ptrace_may_access, after taking the cred_guard_mutex, we'd
> > know that the target task is either outside execve or in the middle of
> > execve, with old and new credentials known; and then we could say "you
> > only get to access that task if you're capable relative to *both* its
> > old and new credentials, since the task currently has both state from
> > the old executable and from the new one".
>
> That doesn't solve the problem with "check_unsafe_exec()" - you might
> miss setting LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE.

You don't need LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE if the tracer has already passed a
ptrace_may_access() check against the post-execve creds of the target
- that's no different from having done PTRACE_ATTACH after execve is
over.