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Message-Id: <20200429220732.31602-25-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2020 15:07:30 -0700
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
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Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for shadow stack
Check an ELF file's .note.gnu.property, and setup shadow stack if the
application supports it.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
---
v9:
- Change cpu_feature_enabled() to static_cpu_has().
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index ac07e1f6a2bc..8b7b97ff5fb4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1970,6 +1970,8 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
select X86_INTEL_CET
select ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE
select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ select ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
+ select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
help
Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack
corruption. It's a hardware feature. This only matters
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
index 69c0f892e310..fac79b621e0a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -367,6 +367,19 @@ extern int compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
int uses_interp);
#define compat_arch_setup_additional_pages compat_arch_setup_additional_pages
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
+struct arch_elf_state {
+ unsigned int gnu_property;
+};
+
+#define INIT_ARCH_ELF_STATE { \
+ .gnu_property = 0, \
+}
+
+#define arch_elf_pt_proc(ehdr, phdr, elf, interp, state) (0)
+#define arch_check_elf(ehdr, interp, interp_ehdr, state) (0)
+#endif
+
/* Do not change the values. See get_align_mask() */
enum align_flags {
ALIGN_VA_32 = BIT(0),
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 5ef9d8f25b0e..93ba4afd0c19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -730,3 +730,32 @@ unsigned long KSTK_ESP(struct task_struct *task)
{
return task_pt_regs(task)->sp;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
+int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, size_t datasz,
+ bool compat, struct arch_elf_state *state)
+{
+ if (type != GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (datasz != sizeof(unsigned int))
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+
+ state->gnu_property = *(unsigned int *)data;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *state)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+
+ memset(¤t->thread.cet, 0, sizeof(struct cet_status));
+
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+ if (state->gnu_property & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
+ r = cet_setup_shstk();
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+#endif
--
2.21.0
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