linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 00/15] Add support for Nitro Enclaves

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Message-ID: <d13f3c5c-33f5-375b-8582-fe37402777cb@redhat.com>
Date:   Thu, 30 Apr 2020 13:38:55 +0200
From:   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:     Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>,
        "Paraschiv, Andra-Irina" <andraprs@...zon.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Anthony Liguori <aliguori@...zon.com>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...zon.com>,
        Colm MacCarthaigh <colmmacc@...zon.com>,
        Bjoern Doebel <doebel@...zon.de>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Frank van der Linden <fllinden@...zon.com>,
        Martin Pohlack <mpohlack@...zon.de>,
        Matt Wilson <msw@...zon.com>, Balbir Singh <sblbir@...zon.com>,
        Stewart Smith <trawets@...zon.com>,
        Uwe Dannowski <uwed@...zon.de>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        ne-devel-upstream@...zon.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 00/15] Add support for Nitro Enclaves

On 30/04/20 13:21, Alexander Graf wrote:
>> Also, would you consider a mode where ne_load_image is not invoked and
>> the enclave starts in real mode at 0xffffff0?
> 
> Consider, sure. But I don't quite see any big benefit just yet. The
> current abstraction level for the booted payloads is much higher. That
> allows us to simplify the device model dramatically: There is no need to
> create a virtual flash region for example.

It doesn't have to be flash, it can be just ROM.

> In addition, by moving firmware into the trusted base, firmware can
> execute validation of the target image. If you make it all flat, how do
> you verify whether what you're booting is what you think you're booting?

So the issue would be that a firmware image provided by the parent could
be tampered with by something malicious running in the parent enclave?

Paolo

> So in a nutshell, for a PV virtual machine spawning interface, I think
> it would make sense to have memory fully owned by the parent. In the
> enclave world, I would rather not like to give the parent too much
> control over what memory actually means, outside of donating a bucket of
> it.