linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v11 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)

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Date:   Mon, 4 May 2020 11:06:06 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Cc:     Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
        Michal Marek <michal.lkml@...kovi.net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>,
        Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@...il.com>,
        clang-built-linux@...glegroups.com,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)

On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 05:52:28PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 01:45:46PM -0700, Sami Tolvanen wrote:
> > On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 12:21:14PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > The vmap version that I asked Sami to drop
> > > is at least better in this regard, although the guard page is at the wrong
> > > end of the stack and we just hope that the allocation below us didn't pass
> > > VM_NO_GUARD. Looks like the same story for vmap stack :/
> > 
> > SCS grows up and the guard page is after the allocation, so how is it at
> > the wrong end? Am I missing something here?
> 
> Sorry, I'd got the SCS upside-down in my head (hey, that second 'S' stands
> for 'Stack'!). But I think I'm right about vmap stack, which feels a
> little fragile even though it seems to work out today with the very limited
> uses of VM_NO_GUARD.

Yeah, when VMAP_STACK was originally being developed, IIRC, there was
an effort made to eliminate all the users of VM_NO_GUARD, and it looks
like it's mostly there. Really the only use left is arm64's kernel image
mapping routines, and then it's not actually used in the traditional
sense -- it's just a boolean for whether to toss in a guard page at the
end of the data section, and the VMAs are built manually. I think that
code could actually be refactored to drop it too and then the only user
would be KASAN, which, IIUC, wants to build consecutive vmap areas.

-- 
Kees Cook