linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] sysctl: Make sure proc handlers can't expose heap memory

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Date:   Mon, 4 May 2020 13:32:07 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>
Cc:     Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@...gle.com>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sysctl: Make sure proc handlers can't expose heap memory

On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 07:59:37PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 12:08:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Just as a precaution, make sure that proc handlers don't accidentally
> > grow "count" beyond the allocated kbuf size.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> > ---
> > This applies to hch's sysctl cleanup tree...
> > ---
> >  fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 3 +++
> >  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> > index 15030784566c..535ab26473af 100644
> > --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> > +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> > @@ -546,6 +546,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct file *filp, void __user *ubuf,
> >  	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
> >  	struct ctl_table_header *head = grab_header(inode);
> >  	struct ctl_table *table = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl_entry;
> > +	size_t count_max = count;
> >  	void *kbuf;
> >  	ssize_t error;
> >  
> > @@ -590,6 +591,8 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct file *filp, void __user *ubuf,
> >  
> >  	if (!write) {
> >  		error = -EFAULT;
> > +		if (WARN_ON(count > count_max))
> > +			count = count_max;
> 
> That crash a system with panic-on-warn. I don't think we want that?

Eh? None of the handlers should be making this mistake currently and
it's not a mistake that can be controlled from userspace. WARN() is
absolutely what's wanted here: report an impossible situation (and
handle it gracefully for the bulk of users that don't have
panic_on_warn set).

-- 
Kees Cook