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Message-Id: <20200504232132.23570-13-daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 01:21:26 +0200
From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@...cle.com>
To: grub-devel@....org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com, x86@...nel.org
Cc: alexander.burmashev@...cle.com, andrew.cooper3@...rix.com,
ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org, dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com,
eric.snowberg@...cle.com, javierm@...hat.com,
kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com,
krystian.hebel@...eb.com, lukasz.hawrylko@...ux.intel.com,
michal.zygowski@...eb.com, mjg59@...gle.com, phcoder@...il.com,
pirot.krol@...eb.com, pjones@...hat.com, ross.philipson@...cle.com
Subject: [GRUB PATCH RFC 12/18] i386/efi: Report UEFI Secure Boot status to the Linux kernel
Otherwise the kernel does not know its state and cannot enable various
security features depending on UEFI Secure Boot.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@...udflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@...cle.com>
---
grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/grub/i386/linux.h | 14 ++++++-
2 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c
index ac1fae72e..952eb1191 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c
@@ -397,6 +397,87 @@ grub_linux_boot_mmap_fill (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t size,
return 0;
}
+#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+/*
+ * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
+ *
+ * Please keep the logic in sync with the Linux kernel,
+ * drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot().
+ */
+static grub_uint8_t
+grub_efi_get_secureboot (void)
+{
+ grub_efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = GRUB_EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
+ grub_efi_guid_t efi_shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+ grub_efi_status_t status;
+ grub_efi_uint32_t attr = 0;
+ grub_size_t size = 0;
+ grub_uint8_t *secboot = NULL;
+ grub_uint8_t *setupmode = NULL;
+ grub_uint8_t *moksbstate = NULL;
+ grub_uint8_t secureboot = GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN;
+ const char *secureboot_str = "UNKNOWN";
+
+ status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
+ &size, (void **) &secboot);
+
+ if (status == GRUB_EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ {
+ secureboot = GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out;
+
+ status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
+ &size, (void **) &setupmode);
+
+ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((*secboot == 0) || (*setupmode == 1))
+ {
+ secureboot = GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
+ * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
+ * honor that.
+ */
+ status = grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes ("MokSBState", &efi_shim_lock_guid,
+ &size, (void **) &moksbstate, &attr);
+
+ /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */
+ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ secureboot = GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!(attr & GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && *moksbstate == 1)
+ secureboot = GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
+
+ secureboot = GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED;
+
+ out:
+ grub_free (moksbstate);
+ grub_free (setupmode);
+ grub_free (secboot);
+
+ if (secureboot == GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED)
+ secureboot_str = "Disabled";
+ else if (secureboot == GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
+ secureboot_str = "Enabled";
+
+ grub_dprintf ("linux", "UEFI Secure Boot state: %s\n", secureboot_str);
+
+ return secureboot;
+}
+#endif
+
static grub_err_t
grub_linux_boot (void)
{
@@ -579,6 +660,9 @@ grub_linux_boot (void)
grub_efi_uintn_t efi_desc_size;
grub_size_t efi_mmap_target;
grub_efi_uint32_t efi_desc_version;
+
+ ctx.params->secure_boot = grub_efi_get_secureboot ();
+
err = grub_efi_finish_boot_services (&efi_mmap_size, efi_mmap_buf, NULL,
&efi_desc_size, &efi_desc_version);
if (err)
@@ -790,7 +874,7 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
linux_params.code32_start = prot_mode_target + lh.code32_start - GRUB_LINUX_BZIMAGE_ADDR;
linux_params.kernel_alignment = (1 << align);
- linux_params.ps_mouse = linux_params.padding10 = 0;
+ linux_params.ps_mouse = linux_params.padding11 = 0;
linux_params.type_of_loader = GRUB_LINUX_BOOT_LOADER_TYPE;
/* These two are used (instead of cmd_line_ptr) by older versions of Linux,
diff --git a/include/grub/i386/linux.h b/include/grub/i386/linux.h
index ce30e7fb0..6aea73ddb 100644
--- a/include/grub/i386/linux.h
+++ b/include/grub/i386/linux.h
@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@
/* Maximum number of MBR signatures to store. */
#define EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX 16
+/* Possible values for Linux secure_boot kernel parameter. */
+#define GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNSET 0
+#define GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN 1
+#define GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED 2
+#define GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED 3
+
#ifdef __x86_64__
#define GRUB_LINUX_EFI_SIGNATURE \
@@ -275,7 +281,11 @@ struct linux_kernel_params
grub_uint8_t mmap_size; /* 1e8 */
- grub_uint8_t padding9[0x1f1 - 0x1e9];
+ grub_uint8_t padding9[0x1ec - 0x1e9];
+
+ grub_uint8_t secure_boot; /* 1ec */
+
+ grub_uint8_t padding10[0x1f1 - 0x1ed];
/* Linux setup header copy - BEGIN. */
grub_uint8_t setup_sects; /* The size of the setup in sectors */
@@ -286,7 +296,7 @@ struct linux_kernel_params
grub_uint16_t vid_mode; /* Video mode control */
grub_uint16_t root_dev; /* Default root device number */
- grub_uint8_t padding10; /* 1fe */
+ grub_uint8_t padding11; /* 1fe */
grub_uint8_t ps_mouse; /* 1ff */
grub_uint16_t jump; /* Jump instruction */
--
2.11.0
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