linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy

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Message-ID: <CAG48ez2PwqoDBx0pkZKFHvMXHNqAc8AfuTR5oPoF-obHqUo0zQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 5 May 2020 02:15:56 +0200
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy

On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 11:18 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
> IMA's mmap appraise policy rules.  Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
> would be taken prior to i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at
> this point.  Eliminate this integrity gap, by denying the mprotect
> PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists.

Just keep in mind that there are other ways to create executable
mappings containing controlled code; e.g. PROT_EXEC with
MAP_ANONYMOUS, or writing to /proc/self/mem (which is a debugging API
that works entirely without ever making the VMA writable - I had an
old series to provide LSM hooks for that stuff at
<https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1478142286-18427-3-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net/>,
but I guess I must have forgotten about it or something...).