linux-kernel - [patch V4 part 1 02/36] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on cpu_entry

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Date:   Tue, 05 May 2020 15:16:04 +0200
From:   Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To:     LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
        Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: [patch V4 part 1 02/36] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints
 on cpu_entry_area

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>

A data breakpoint near the top of an IST stack will cause unresoverable
recursion.  A data breakpoint on the GDT, IDT, or TSS is terrifying.
Prevent either of these from happening.

Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -227,10 +227,35 @@ int arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace(struct
 	return (va >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) || ((va + len - 1) >= TASK_SIZE_MAX);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Checks whether the range from addr to end, inclusive, overlaps the CPU
+ * entry area range.
+ */
+static inline bool within_cpu_entry_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
+{
+	return end >= CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PER_CPU &&
+	       addr < (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PER_CPU + CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE);
+}
+
 static int arch_build_bp_info(struct perf_event *bp,
 			      const struct perf_event_attr *attr,
 			      struct arch_hw_breakpoint *hw)
 {
+	unsigned long bp_end;
+
+	bp_end = attr->bp_addr + attr->bp_len - 1;
+	if (bp_end < attr->bp_addr)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prevent any breakpoint of any type that overlaps the
+	 * cpu_entry_area.  This protects the IST stacks and also
+	 * reduces the chance that we ever find out what happens if
+	 * there's a data breakpoint on the GDT, IDT, or TSS.
+	 */
+	if (within_cpu_entry_area(attr->bp_addr, bp_end))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	hw->address = attr->bp_addr;
 	hw->mask = 0;