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Message-ID: <c26a39cc-1387-b55c-ec45-ec0e2357dd47@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 09:52:57 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: sam <sunhaoyl@...look.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/fpu/xstate: Clear uninitialized xstate areas in core
dump
On 5/7/20 9:49 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> In a core dump, copy_xstate_to_kernel() copies only enabled user xfeatures
> to a kernel buffer without touching areas for disabled xfeatures. However,
> those uninitialized areas may contain random data, which is then written to
> the core dump file and can be read by a non-privileged user.
>
> Fix it by clearing uninitialized areas.
Do you have a Fixes: tag for this, or some background on where this
issue originated that might be helpful for backports?
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