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Message-Id: <C5E11731-5503-45CC-9F72-41E8863ACD27@lca.pw>
Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 22:50:19 -0400
From: Qian Cai <cai@....pw>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
dyoung@...hat.com, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Rafael Aquini <aquini@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: add panic_on_taint
> On May 6, 2020, at 6:28 PM, Rafael Aquini <aquini@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
> introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
> provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
> a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
>
> This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding
> the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into
> code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest.
> Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
Andrew, you can drop the patch below from -mm now because that one is now obsolete,
mm-slub-add-panic_on_error-to-the-debug-facilities.patch
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