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Date:   Wed, 6 May 2020 22:50:19 -0400
From:   Qian Cai <>
To:     Andrew Morton <>
Cc:     LKML <>,,,,, Baoquan He <>,
        Jonathan Corbet <>,
        Luis Chamberlain <>,
        Kees Cook <>,
        Rafael Aquini <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: add panic_on_taint

> On May 6, 2020, at 6:28 PM, Rafael Aquini <> wrote:
> Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
> introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
> provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
> a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
> This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding
> the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into
> code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest.
> Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.

Andrew, you can drop the patch below from -mm now because that one is now obsolete,


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