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Message-ID: <20200507185315.GH205881@optiplex-lnx>
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 14:53:15 -0400
From: Rafael Aquini <aquini@...hat.com>
To: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
dyoung@...hat.com, bhe@...hat.com, corbet@....net,
keescook@...omium.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, cai@....pw,
rdunlap@...radead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kernel: add panic_on_taint
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:50:46PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> > as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> > case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
>
> If used for this purpose then we must add a new TAINT flag for
> proc_taint() was used, otherwise we can cheat to show a taint
> *did* happen, where in fact it never happened, some punk just
> echo'd a value into the kernel's /proc/sys/kernel/tainted.
>
To accomplish that, the punk would need to be root, though, in which
case everything else is doomed, already.
> Forunately proc_taint() only allows to *increment* the taint, not
> reduce.
>
> Luis
>
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