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Message-Id: <27AA744E-930A-492A-BE87-05A119FE1549@lca.pw>
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 18:05:27 -0400
From: Qian Cai <cai@....pw>
To: Rafael Aquini <aquini@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
dyoung@...hat.com, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: add panic_on_taint
> On May 7, 2020, at 4:42 PM, Rafael Aquini <aquini@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 10:50:19PM -0400, Qian Cai wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On May 6, 2020, at 6:28 PM, Rafael Aquini <aquini@...hat.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
>>> introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
>>> provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
>>> a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
>>>
>>> This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding
>>> the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into
>>> code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest.
>>> Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
>>> as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
>>> case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
>>
>> Andrew, you can drop the patch below from -mm now because that one is now obsolete,
>>
>> mm-slub-add-panic_on_error-to-the-debug-facilities.patch
>>
> Please, don't drop it yet. I'll send a patch to get rid of the bits,
> once this one gets accepted, if it gets accepted.
Why do you ever want that obsolete patch even show up in linux-next to potentailly waste other people/bots time to test it and develop things on top of it?
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