linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v29 00/20] Intel SGX foundations

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Message-ID: <op.0j9p6106wjvjmi@hhuan26-mobl1.amr.corp.intel.com>
Date:   Thu, 07 May 2020 17:31:39 -0500
From:   "Haitao Huang" <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com>
To:     "Nathaniel McCallum" <npmccallum@...hat.com>
Cc:     "Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        dave.hansen@...el.com, "Neil Horman" <nhorman@...hat.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
        andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, bp@...en8.de,
        "Josh Triplett" <josh@...htriplett.org>, luto@...nel.org,
        kai.huang@...el.com, "David Rientjes" <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@...el.com>,
        "Patrick Uiterwijk" <puiterwijk@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v29 00/20] Intel SGX foundations

On Thu, 07 May 2020 11:49:15 -0500, Nathaniel McCallum  
<npmccallum@...hat.com> wrote:

> On Thu, May 7, 2020 at 1:03 AM Haitao Huang
> <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, 06 May 2020 17:14:22 -0500, Sean Christopherson
>> <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com> wrote:
>>
>> > On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 05:42:42PM -0400, Nathaniel McCallum wrote:
>> >> Tested on Enarx. This requires a patch[0] for v29 support.
>> >>
>> >> Tested-by: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@...hat.com>
>> >>
>> >> However, we did uncover a small usability issue. See below.
>> >>
>> >> [0]:
>> >>  
>> https://github.com/enarx/enarx/pull/507/commits/80da2352aba46aa7bc6b4d1fccf20fe1bda58662
>> >
>> > ...
>> >
>> >> > * Disallow mmap(PROT_NONE) from /dev/sgx. Any mapping (e.g.
>> >> anonymous) can
>> >> >   be used to reserve the address range. Now /dev/sgx supports only
>> >> opaque
>> >> >   mappings to the (initialized) enclave data.
>> >>
>> >> The statement "Any mapping..." isn't actually true.
>> >>
>> >> Enarx creates a large enclave (currently 64GiB). This worked when we
>> >> created a file-backed mapping on /dev/sgx/enclave. However, switching
>> >> to an anonymous mapping fails with ENOMEM. We suspect this is because
>> >> the kernel attempts to allocate all the pages and zero them but there
>> >> is insufficient RAM available. We currently work around this by
>> >> creating a shared mapping on /dev/zero.
>> >
>> > Hmm, the kernel shouldn't actually allocate physical pages unless  
>> they're
>> > written.  I'll see if I can reproduce.
>> >
>>
>> For larger size mmap, I think it requires enabling vm overcommit mode 1:
>> echo 1 | sudo tee /proc/sys/vm/overcommit_memory
>
> Which means the default experience isn't good.
>


Yes, it is not good default. But this is not sgx specific IIUC. Normal  
applications would have the same issue if they ask for large mapping than  
whatever limit kernel enforces by default.