linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.4 057/312] dccp: limit sk

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Date:   Fri,  8 May 2020 14:30:48 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 057/312] dccp: limit sk_filter trim to payload

From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>

commit 4f0c40d94461cfd23893a17335b2ab78ecb333c8 upstream.

Dccp verifies packet integrity, including length, at initial rcv in
dccp_invalid_packet, later pulls headers in dccp_enqueue_skb.

A call to sk_filter in-between can cause __skb_pull to wrap skb->len.
skb_copy_datagram_msg interprets this as a negative value, so
(correctly) fails with EFAULT. The negative length is reported in
ioctl SIOCINQ or possibly in a DCCP_WARN in dccp_close.

Introduce an sk_receive_skb variant that caps how small a filter
program can trim packets, and call this in dccp with the header
length. Excessively trimmed packets are now processed normally and
queued for reception as 0B payloads.

Fixes: 7c657876b63c ("[DCCP]: Initial implementation")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 include/net/sock.h |    8 +++++++-
 net/core/sock.c    |    7 ++++---
 net/dccp/ipv4.c    |    2 +-
 net/dccp/ipv6.c    |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -1651,7 +1651,13 @@ static inline void sock_put(struct sock
  */
 void sock_gen_put(struct sock *sk);
 
-int sk_receive_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const int nested);
+int __sk_receive_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const int nested,
+		     unsigned int trim_cap);
+static inline int sk_receive_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 const int nested)
+{
+	return __sk_receive_skb(sk, skb, nested, 1);
+}
 
 static inline void sk_tx_queue_set(struct sock *sk, int tx_queue)
 {
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -484,11 +484,12 @@ int sock_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_queue_rcv_skb);
 
-int sk_receive_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const int nested)
+int __sk_receive_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+		     const int nested, unsigned int trim_cap)
 {
 	int rc = NET_RX_SUCCESS;
 
-	if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
+	if (sk_filter_trim_cap(sk, skb, trim_cap))
 		goto discard_and_relse;
 
 	skb->dev = NULL;
@@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ discard_and_relse:
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 	goto out;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_receive_skb);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sk_receive_skb);
 
 struct dst_entry *__sk_dst_check(struct sock *sk, u32 cookie)
 {
--- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ lookup:
 		goto discard_and_relse;
 	nf_reset(skb);
 
-	return sk_receive_skb(sk, skb, 1);
+	return __sk_receive_skb(sk, skb, 1, dh->dccph_doff * 4);
 
 no_dccp_socket:
 	if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ lookup:
 	if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
 		goto discard_and_relse;
 
-	return sk_receive_skb(sk, skb, 1) ? -1 : 0;
+	return __sk_receive_skb(sk, skb, 1, dh->dccph_doff * 4) ? -1 : 0;
 
 no_dccp_socket:
 	if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))