linux-kernel - [PATCH 13/20] drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c: get rid of pointless access

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Message-Id: <20200509234557.1124086-13-viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date:   Sun, 10 May 2020 00:45:50 +0100
From:   Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Subject: [PATCH 13/20] drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()

From: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>

Contrary to the comments, those do *NOT* verify anything about
writability of memory, etc.

In all cases addresses are passed only to copy_to_user().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 15 +++------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 896f190b9a50..7f97164cbafb 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -371,8 +371,7 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
 		goto cmd;
 
 	/* allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the CSR blob */
-	if (!access_ok(input.address, input.length) ||
-	    input.length > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
+	if (input.length > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto e_free;
 	}
@@ -609,12 +608,6 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_get_id2(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
 	if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	/* Check if we have write access to the userspace buffer */
-	if (input.address &&
-	    input.length &&
-	    !access_ok(input.address, input.length))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
 	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -730,15 +723,13 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
 		goto cmd;
 
 	/* Allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the PDH blob. */
-	if ((input.pdh_cert_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) ||
-	    !access_ok(input.pdh_cert_address, input.pdh_cert_len)) {
+	if (input.pdh_cert_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto e_free;
 	}
 
 	/* Allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the cert chain blob. */
-	if ((input.cert_chain_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) ||
-	    !access_ok(input.cert_chain_address, input.cert_chain_len)) {
+	if (input.cert_chain_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto e_free;
 	}
-- 
2.11.0