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Message-ID: <20200511134921.GC2940@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 15:49:21 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@...lfernandes.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
Vineeth Pillai <vpillai@...italocean.com>,
Allison Randal <allison@...utok.net>,
Armijn Hemel <armijn@...ldur.nl>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>, Muchun Song <smuchun@...il.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] Add support for core-wide protection of IRQ and
softirq
On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 07:46:52PM -0400, Joel Fernandes (Google) wrote:
> With current core scheduling patchset, non-threaded IRQ and softirq
> victims can leak data from its hyperthread to a sibling hyperthread
> running an attacker.
>
> For MDS, it is possible for the IRQ and softirq handlers to leak data to
> either host or guest attackers. For L1TF, it is possible to leak to
> guest attackers. There is no possible mitigation involving flushing of
> buffers to avoid this since the execution of attacker and victims happen
> concurrently on 2 or more HTs.
>
> The solution in this patch is to monitor the outer-most core-wide
> irq_enter() and irq_exit() executed by any sibling. In between these
> two, we mark the core to be in a special core-wide IRQ state.
Another possible option is force_irqthreads :-) That would cure it
nicely.
Anyway, I'll go read this.
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