linux-kernel - [PATCH] seccomp: Report number of loaded filters in /proc/$pid/status

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Message-ID: <202005131414.410DFE77DC@keescook>
Date:   Wed, 13 May 2020 14:18:17 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: Report number of loaded filters in /proc/$pid/status

A common question asked when debugging seccomp filters is "how many
filters are attached to your process?" A common mistake for process
launchers is applying filters before fork, instead of after, which means
each progressive child has an extra redundant filter added, which will
slowly increase syscall overhead. Provide a way to easily diagnose these
conditions through /proc/$pid/status with a "Seccomp_filters" line.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
 fs/proc/array.c         | 2 ++
 include/linux/seccomp.h | 2 ++
 init/init_task.c        | 3 +++
 kernel/seccomp.c        | 3 +++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index 8e16f14bb05a..8542a9c21dff 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
 	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "NoNewPrivs:\t", task_no_new_privs(p));
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\nSeccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
+	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\nSeccomp_filters:\t",
+			    atomic_read(&p->seccomp.filter_count));
 #endif
 	seq_puts(m, "\nSpeculation_Store_Bypass:\t");
 	switch (arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(p, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS)) {
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 4192369b8418..2ec2720f83cc 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <asm/seccomp.h>
 
 struct seccomp_filter;
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ struct seccomp_filter;
  */
 struct seccomp {
 	int mode;
+	atomic_t filter_count;
 	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
 };
 
diff --git a/init/init_task.c b/init/init_task.c
index bd403ed3e418..dd108a8689ac 100644
--- a/init/init_task.c
+++ b/init/init_task.c
@@ -182,6 +182,9 @@ struct task_struct init_task
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 	.security	= NULL,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+	.seccomp	= { .filter_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0) },
+#endif
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_task);
 
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 55a6184f5990..46d883574476 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -398,6 +398,8 @@ static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags)
 		put_seccomp_filter(thread);
 		smp_store_release(&thread->seccomp.filter,
 				  caller->seccomp.filter);
+		atomic_set(&thread->seccomp.filter_count,
+			   atomic_read(&thread->seccomp.filter_count));
 
 		/*
 		 * Don't let an unprivileged task work around
@@ -544,6 +546,7 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
 	 */
 	filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
 	current->seccomp.filter = filter;
+	atomic_inc(&current->seccomp.filter_count);
 
 	/* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
 	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
-- 
2.20.1


-- 
Kees Cook