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Date:   Thu, 14 May 2020 16:53:34 +0530
From:   Sumit Garg <>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <>
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <>,
        James Bottomley <>,,
        Jens Wiklander <>,
        Jonathan Corbet <>,
        James Morris <>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <>,
        Casey Schaufler <>,
        Janne Karhunen <>,
        Daniel Thompson <>,
        Markus Wamser <>,
        "open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <>,,,
        Linux Doc Mailing List <>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <>,
        linux-arm-kernel <>,,
        "tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework

On Thu, 14 May 2020 at 05:55, Jarkko Sakkinen
<> wrote:
> On Wed, 2020-05-06 at 15:10 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> > an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> > like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusked keys
> > support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
> >
> > So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying
> > implemtations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <>
> > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <>
> I tend to agree how this is implemented and could merge it as such.
> I'm just thinking if we could refine this patch in a way that instead of
> copying TRUSTED_DEBUG macro we could just replace pr_info() statements
> with pr_debug()?

AFAIU, TRUSTED_DEBUG being a security sensitive operation is only
meant to be used in development environments and should be strictly
disabled in production environments. But it may not always be true
with pr_debug() with CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y which allows the debug
paths to be compiled into the kernel which can be enabled/disabled at

IMO we should keep this TRUSTED_DEBUG macro, so that users are aware
of its security sensitive nature and need to explicitly enable it to


> /Jarkko

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