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Message-ID: <956b284c2b144313fd158de75cba510eb98f71bf.camel@linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 03:00:25 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>, dhowells@...hat.com,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@...il.com>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@...aro.org>,
Markus Wamser <Markus.Wamser@...ed-mode.de>,
"open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org,
"tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@...ts.linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
On Thu, 2020-05-14 at 16:53 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> On Thu, 14 May 2020 at 05:55, Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, 2020-05-06 at 15:10 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > > Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> > > an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> > > like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusked keys
> > > support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
> > >
> > > So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying
> > > implemtations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in.
> > >
> > > Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> >
> > I tend to agree how this is implemented and could merge it as such.
> >
> > I'm just thinking if we could refine this patch in a way that instead of
> > copying TRUSTED_DEBUG macro we could just replace pr_info() statements
> > with pr_debug()?
>
> AFAIU, TRUSTED_DEBUG being a security sensitive operation is only
> meant to be used in development environments and should be strictly
> disabled in production environments. But it may not always be true
> with pr_debug() with CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y which allows the debug
> paths to be compiled into the kernel which can be enabled/disabled at
> runtime.
>
> IMO we should keep this TRUSTED_DEBUG macro, so that users are aware
> of its security sensitive nature and need to explicitly enable it to
> debug.
You are absolutely correct.
/Jarkko
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