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Message-Id: <20200518173511.830041124@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 18 May 2020 19:36:19 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Randall Huang <huangrandall@...gle.com>,
        Chao Yu <yuchao0@...wei.com>, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>,
        Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 047/114] f2fs: fix to avoid memory leakage in f2fs_listxattr

From: Randall Huang <huangrandall@...gle.com>

commit 688078e7f36c293dae25b338ddc9e0a2790f6e06 upstream.

In f2fs_listxattr, there is no boundary check before
memcpy e_name to buffer.
If the e_name_len is corrupted,
unexpected memory contents may be returned to the buffer.

Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <huangrandall@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@...wei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: Use f2fs_msg() instead of f2fs_err()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/f2fs/xattr.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
@@ -516,8 +516,9 @@ out:
 ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
 	struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
-	void *base_addr;
+	void *base_addr, *last_base_addr;
 	int error = 0;
 	size_t rest = buffer_size;
 
@@ -527,6 +528,8 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *de
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
+	last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
+
 	list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
 		const struct xattr_handler *handler =
 			f2fs_xattr_handler(entry->e_name_index);
@@ -534,6 +537,16 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *de
 		size_t prefix_len;
 		size_t size;
 
+		if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+			(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr) {
+			f2fs_msg(dentry->d_sb, KERN_ERR,
+				 "inode (%lu) has corrupted xattr",
+				 inode->i_ino);
+			set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+			error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+
 		if (!handler || (handler->list && !handler->list(dentry)))
 			continue;
 


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