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Date:   Tue, 19 May 2020 19:58:50 -0000
From:   "tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To:     linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>,
        Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
        x86 <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [tip: x86/entry] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on
 cpu_entry_area

The following commit has been merged into the x86/entry branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     3ea11ac991d594728e5df42f7eb1145072b9c2bc
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/3ea11ac991d594728e5df42f7eb1145072b9c2bc
Author:        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 24 Feb 2020 13:24:58 +01:00
Committer:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
CommitterDate: Fri, 15 May 2020 20:03:03 +02:00

x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on cpu_entry_area

A data breakpoint near the top of an IST stack will cause unrecoverable
recursion.  A data breakpoint on the GDT, IDT, or TSS is terrifying.
Prevent either of these from happening.

Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505134058.272448010@linutronix.de

---
 arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
index 4d8d53e..d42fc0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -227,10 +227,35 @@ int arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace(struct arch_hw_breakpoint *hw)
 	return (va >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) || ((va + len - 1) >= TASK_SIZE_MAX);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Checks whether the range from addr to end, inclusive, overlaps the CPU
+ * entry area range.
+ */
+static inline bool within_cpu_entry_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
+{
+	return end >= CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE &&
+	       addr < (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE + CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE);
+}
+
 static int arch_build_bp_info(struct perf_event *bp,
 			      const struct perf_event_attr *attr,
 			      struct arch_hw_breakpoint *hw)
 {
+	unsigned long bp_end;
+
+	bp_end = attr->bp_addr + attr->bp_len - 1;
+	if (bp_end < attr->bp_addr)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prevent any breakpoint of any type that overlaps the
+	 * cpu_entry_area.  This protects the IST stacks and also
+	 * reduces the chance that we ever find out what happens if
+	 * there's a data breakpoint on the GDT, IDT, or TSS.
+	 */
+	if (within_cpu_entry_area(attr->bp_addr, bp_end))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	hw->address = attr->bp_addr;
 	hw->mask = 0;
 

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