[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20200525152517.GY325280@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 17:25:17 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: protects more cpu entry data
On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 02:50:57PM +0000, Lai Jiangshan wrote:
> Hello
>
> The patchset is based on (tag: entry-v9-the-rest, tglx-devel/x86/entry).
> And it is complement of 3ea11ac991d
> ("x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on cpu_entry_area").
>
> After reading the code, we can see that more data needs to be protected
> against hw_breakpoint, otherwise it may cause
> dangerous/recursive/unwanted #DB.
>
>
> Lai Jiangshan (5):
> x86/hw_breakpoint: add within_area() to check data breakpoints
> x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on direct GDT
> x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on per_cpu cpu_tss_rw
I think we can actually get rid of that #DB IST stack frobbing, also see
patches linked below.
> x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on user_pcid_flush_mask
Should we disallow the full structure just to be sure?
> x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on debug_idt_table
That's going away, see:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200522204738.645043059@infradead.org
But yes, nice!
Powered by blists - more mailing lists