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Message-ID: <f2c3e93a-6e43-8ce3-d711-2018c7be3063@yandex-team.ru>
Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 19:05:08 +0300
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@...dex-team.ru>
To: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
Cc: linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: dump_page: add debugfs file for dumping page state by
pfn
b
On 25/05/2020 19.03, Konstantin Khlebnikov wrote:
>
>
> On 25/05/2020 18.33, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
>> On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 05:19:11PM +0300, Konstantin Khlebnikov wrote:
>>> Tool 'page-types' could list pages mapped by process or file cache pages,
>>> but it shows only limited amount of state exported via procfs.
>>>
>>> Let's employ existing helper dump_page() to reach remaining information:
>>> writing pfn into /sys/kernel/debug/dump_page dumps state into kernel log.
>>>
>>> # echo 0x37c43c > /sys/kernel/debug/dump_page
>>> # dmesg | tail -6
>>> page:ffffcb0b0df10f00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000007755d3d9 index:0x30
>>> 0xffffffffae4239e0 name:"libGeoIP.so.1.6.9"
>>> flags: 0x200000000020014(uptodate|lru|mappedtodisk)
>>> raw: 0200000000020014 ffffcb0b187fd288 ffffcb0b189e6248 ffff9528a04afe10
>>> raw: 0000000000000030 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
>>> page dumped because: debugfs request
>>
>> This makes me deeply uncomfortable. We're using %px, and %lx
>> (for the 'raw' lines) so we actually get to see kernel addresses.
>> We've rationalised this in the past as being acceptable because you're
>> already in an "assert triggered" kind of situation. Now you're adding
>> a way for any process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to get kernel addresses dumped
>> into the syslog.
>>
>> I think we need a different function for this, or we need to re-audit
>> dump_page() for exposing kernel pointers, and not expose the raw data
>> in struct page.
>>
>
> It's better to add switch for disabling paranoia if bad things happening.
> I.e. keep everything safe by default (or whatever sysctl/config set) and
> flip the switch when needed.
Also I'm ok to seal this interface if kernel in mode of serious paranoia.
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