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Message-ID: <20200526081752.GA2650351@kroah.com>
Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 10:17:52 +0200
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, x86@...nel.org,
keescook@...omium.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
sashal@...nel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] x86: Pin cr4 FSGSBASE
On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 09:57:36AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 08:56:18AM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 10:28:48PM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
> > > From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
> > >
> > > Since there seem to be kernel modules floating around that set
> > > FSGSBASE incorrectly, prevent this in the CR4 pinning. Currently
> > > CR4 pinning just checks that bits are set, this also checks
> > > that the FSGSBASE bit is not set, and if it is clears it again.
> >
> > So we are trying to "protect" ourselves from broken out-of-tree kernel
> > modules now? Why stop with this type of check, why not just forbid them
> > entirely if we don't trust them? :)
>
> Oh, I have a bunch of patches pending for that :-)
Ah, I thought I had seen something like that go by a while ago.
It's sad that we have to write a "don't do stupid things" checker for
kernel modules now :(
> It will basically decode the module text and refuse to load the module
> for most CPL0 instruction.
Ok, so why would Andi's patch even be needed then? Andi, why post this?
thanks,
greg k-h
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