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Message-ID: <202005271457.CF4BBB47@keescook>
Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 15:36:09 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Matt Denton <mpdenton@...gle.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Chris Palmer <palmer@...gle.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Robert Sesek <rsesek@...gle.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] seccomp: notify user trap about unused filter
On Wed, May 27, 2020 at 03:52:03PM -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Wed, May 27, 2020 at 02:43:49PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > (While I'm here -- why can there be only one listener per task? The
> > notifications are filter-specific, not task-specific?)
>
> Not sure what you mean here?
tatic struct file *init_listener(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
{
struct file *ret = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
struct seccomp_filter *cur;
for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
if (cur->notif)
goto out;
}
...
/* Installing a second listener in the chain should EBUSY */
EXPECT_EQ(user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER),
-1);
EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBUSY);
Why does this limit exist? Since the fd is tied to a specific filter,
I don't see conflicts about having multiple USER_NOTIF filters on one
task -- the monitor's response will either fake it or continue it, so
there is no "composition" needed? I must be missing something.
> Maybe it's best to decouple them entirely, and have usage go back to
> just being the number of tasks, and introduce a new counter for
> notification fds.
But isn't that already tracked by the VFS? i.e. there is a one-to-one
mapping from the "struct file *" returned by "anon_inode_getfile()" and
the "struct filter" (though we do not presently save it in the filter)
and the VFS tracks how many userspace fds are attached to that struct
file via ->f_count (i.e. f_count reaching zero is what triggers calling
seccomp_notify_release()).
In trying to write up an example patch for this, though, yeah, I don't
see how to do the locking. There is the "file" part, which is effectively
held by both any task's fd table and by the seccomp filter.
I suspect the issue is that the private_data can't be the
seccomp_filter. The "validity" of the mapping between kernel and user
needs to be tracked externally:
struct seccomp_notification_pipe
{
struct filter *filter;
struct file *file;
};
But I still can't see where to put the lock or refcount....
--
Kees Cook
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