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Message-Id: <20200528201402.1708239-3-sashal@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 16:13:48 -0400
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To: tglx@...utronix.de, luto@...nel.org, ak@...ux.intel.com
Cc: corbet@....net, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, x86@...nel.org,
shuah@...nel.org, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, tony.luck@...el.com,
chang.seok.bae@...el.com, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
peterz@...radead.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com,
Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v13 02/16] x86/cpu: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
This is temporary. It will allow the next few patches to be tested
incrementally.
Setting unsafe_fsgsbase is a root hole. Don't do it.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1557309753-24073-4-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 7bc83f3d9bdf..af3aaade195b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3033,6 +3033,9 @@
no5lvl [X86-64] Disable 5-level paging mode. Forces
kernel to use 4-level paging instead.
+ unsafe_fsgsbase [X86] Allow FSGSBASE instructions. This will be
+ replaced with a nofsgsbase flag.
+
no_console_suspend
[HW] Never suspend the console
Disable suspending of consoles during suspend and
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index bed0cb83fe24..4224760c74e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -418,6 +418,22 @@ static void __init setup_cr_pinning(void)
static_key_enable(&cr_pinning.key);
}
+/*
+ * Temporary hack: FSGSBASE is unsafe until a few kernel code paths are
+ * updated. This allows us to get the kernel ready incrementally.
+ *
+ * Once all the pieces are in place, these will go away and be replaced with
+ * a nofsgsbase chicken flag.
+ */
+static bool unsafe_fsgsbase;
+
+static __init int setup_unsafe_fsgsbase(char *arg)
+{
+ unsafe_fsgsbase = true;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("unsafe_fsgsbase", setup_unsafe_fsgsbase);
+
/*
* Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
*/
@@ -1478,6 +1494,14 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_smap(c);
setup_umip(c);
+ /* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
+ if (unsafe_fsgsbase)
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
+ else
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
+ }
+
/*
* The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
* Now we do "generic changes."
--
2.25.1
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