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Message-ID: <85367hkl06.fsf@collabora.com>
Date: Sat, 30 May 2020 20:26:17 -0400
From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@...labora.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel@...labora.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Paul Gofman <gofmanp@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] seccomp: Implement syscall isolation based on memory areas
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> writes:
>> On May 29, 2020, at 11:00 PM, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@...labora.com> wrote:
>>
>> Modern Windows applications are executing system call instructions
>> directly from the application's code without going through the WinAPI.
>> This breaks Wine emulation, because it doesn't have a chance to
>> intercept and emulate these syscalls before they are submitted to Linux.
>>
>> In addition, we cannot simply trap every system call of the application
>> to userspace using PTRACE_SYSEMU, because performance would suffer,
>> since our main use case is to run Windows games over Linux. Therefore,
>> we need some in-kernel filtering to decide whether the syscall was
>> issued by the wine code or by the windows application.
>
> Do you really need in-kernel filtering? What if you could have
> efficient userspace filtering instead? That is, set something up so
> that all syscalls, except those from a special address, are translated
> to CALL thunk where the thunk is configured per task. Then the thunk
> can do whatever emulation is needed.
Hi,
I suggested something similar to my customer, by using
libsyscall-intercept. The idea would be overwritting the syscall
instruction with a call to the entry point. I'm not a specialist on the
specifics of Windows games, (cc'ed Paul Gofman, who can provide more
details on that side), but as far as I understand, the reason why that
is not feasible is that the anti-cheat protection in games will abort
execution if the binary region was modified either on-disk or in-memory.
Is there some mechanism to do that without modiyfing the application?
> Getting the details and especially the interaction with any seccomp
> filters that may be installed right could be tricky, but the performance
> should be decent, at least on non-PTI systems.
>
> (If we go this route, I suspect that the correct interaction with
> seccomp is that this type of redirection takes precedence over seccomp
> and seccomp filters are not invoked for redirected syscalls. After all,
> a redirected syscall is, functionally, not a syscall at all.)
>
--
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
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