linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFC] uaccess: user_access_begin_after_access

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Date:   Tue, 2 Jun 2020 16:32:55 -0400
From:   "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] uaccess: user_access_begin_after_access_ok()

On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 10:18:09AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 2, 2020 at 9:33 AM Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > It's not clear whether we need a new API, I think __uaccess_being() has the
> > > assumption that the address has been validated by access_ok().
> >
> > __uaccess_begin() is a stopgap, not a public API.
> 
> Correct. It's just an x86 implementation detail.
> 
> > The problem is real, but "let's add a public API that would do user_access_begin()
> > with access_ok() already done" is no-go.
> 
> Yeah, it's completely pointless.
> 
> The solution to this is easy: remove the incorrect and useless early
> "access_ok()". Boom, done.

Hmm are you sure we can drop it? access_ok is done in the context
of the process. Access itself in the context of a kernel thread
that borrows the same mm. IIUC if the process can be 32 bit
while the kernel is 64 bit, access_ok in the context of the
kernel thread will not DTRT.


> Then use user_access_begin() and the appropriate unsage_get/put_user()
> sequence, and user_access_end().
> 
> The range test that user-access-begin does is not just part of the
> ABI, it's just required in general. We have almost thirty years of
> history of trying to avoid it, AND IT WAS ALL BOGUS.
> 
> The fact is, the range check is pretty damn cheap, and not doing the
> range check has always been a complete and utter disaster.
> 
> You have exactly two cases:
> 
>  (a) the access_ok() would be right above the code and can't be missed
> 
>  (b) not
> 
> and in (a) the solution is: remove the access_ok() and let
> user_access_begin() do the range check.
> 
> In (b), the solution is literally "DON'T DO THAT!"
> 
> Because EVERY SINGLE TIME people have eventually noticed (possibly
> after code movement) that "oops, we never did the access_ok at all,
> and now we can be fooled into kernel corruption and a security issue".
> 
> And even if that didn't happen, the worry was there.
> 
> End result: use user_access_begin() and stop trying to remove the two
> cycles or whatever of the limit checking cost. The "upside" of
> removing that limit check just isn't. It's a downside.
> 
>                  Linus

That's true. Limit check cost is measureable but very small.
It's the speculation barrier that's costly.

-- 
MST