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Message-ID: <20200602070854.GA16602@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 10:08:54 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>, dhowells@...hat.com,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@...il.com>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@...aro.org>,
Markus Wamser <Markus.Wamser@...ed-mode.de>,
"open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org,
"tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org" <tee-dev@...ts.linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 02:20:26PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> On Mon, 1 Jun 2020 at 07:30, Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 03:10:14PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > > Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
> > > an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
> > > like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusked keys
> > > support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
> > >
> > > So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying
> > > implemtations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in.
> > >
> > > Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> > > ---
> > > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 45 ++++
> > > include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 15 --
> > > security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 +
> > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_common.c | 333 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >
> > I think trusted_core.c would be a better name (less ambiguous).
> >
>
> Okay.
>
> > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 335 +++++-----------------------
> > > 5 files changed, 437 insertions(+), 292 deletions(-)
> > > create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_common.c
> > >
> > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> > > index a94c03a..5559010 100644
> > > --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> > > +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> > > @@ -40,6 +40,51 @@ struct trusted_key_options {
> > > uint32_t policyhandle;
> > > };
> > >
> > > +struct trusted_key_ops {
> > > + /*
> > > + * flag to indicate if trusted key implementation supports migration
> > > + * or not.
> > > + */
> > > + unsigned char migratable;
> > > +
> > > + /* trusted key init */
> > > + int (*init)(void);
> >
> > /* Init a key. */
> >
>
> This API isn't initializing a key but rather the underlying interface
> (see init_tpm_trusted()). So how about:
>
> /* Initialize key interface */
Sure (also for others can use common sense).
>
> > > +
> > > + /* seal a trusted key */
> > > + int (*seal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob);
> >
> > /* Seal a key. */
> >
>
> Ack.
>
> > > +
> > > + /* unseal a trusted key */
> > > + int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob);
> >
> > /* Unseal a key. */
> >
>
> Ack.
>
> > > +
> > > + /* get random trusted key */
> > > + int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
> >
> > /* Get a randomized key. */
> >
>
> Ack.
>
> > > +
> > > + /* trusted key cleanup */
> > > + void (*cleanup)(void);
> >
> > Please remove this from this commit since it is not in use in the scope
> > of this commit. You should instead make a separate commit just for this
> > callback, which explains what it is and how it will be used in the
> > follow up commits.
> >
>
> This API is pretty much relevant to TPM as well (see:
> cleanup_tpm_trusted()) but I guess "cleanup()" terminology is bringing
> up some confusion, so how about to call it "exit()" instead?
>
> >
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
> > > +#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM)
> > > +extern struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops;
> > > +#endif
> > > +
> > > +#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0
> > > +
> > > +#if TRUSTED_DEBUG
> > > +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
> > > +{
> > > + pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
> > > + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> > > + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
> > > + pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
> > > + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> > > + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
> > > + pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
> > > +}
> > > +#else
> > > +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
> > > +{
> > > +}
> > > +#endif
> > >
> > > #endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */
> > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> > > index a56d8e1..5753231 100644
> > > --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> > > +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> > > @@ -60,17 +60,6 @@ static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
> > > 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
> > > -{
> > > - pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
> > > - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> > > - 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
> > > - pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
> > > - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> > > - 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
> > > - pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
> > > -}
> > > -
> > > static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
> > > {
> > > print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
> > > @@ -96,10 +85,6 @@ static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
> > > {
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
> > > -{
> > > -}
> > > -
> > > static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
> > > {
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> > > index 7b73ceb..2b1085b 100644
> > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> > > @@ -4,5 +4,6 @@
> > > #
> > >
> > > obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
> > > +trusted-y += trusted_common.o
> > > trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o
> > > trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o
> > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_common.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_common.c
> > > new file mode 100644
> > > index 0000000..9bfd081
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_common.c
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
> > > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> > > +/*
> > > + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
> > > + * Copyright (c) 2019, Linaro Limited
> > > + *
> > > + * Author:
> > > + * David Safford <safford@...ibm.com>
> > > + * Added generic trusted key framework: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> > > + *
> > > + * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> > > + */
> > > +
> > > +#include <keys/user-type.h>
> > > +#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> > > +#include <linux/capability.h>
> > > +#include <linux/err.h>
> > > +#include <linux/init.h>
> > > +#include <linux/key-type.h>
> > > +#include <linux/module.h>
> > > +#include <linux/parser.h>
> > > +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> > > +#include <linux/slab.h>
> > > +#include <linux/string.h>
> > > +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > > +
> > > +static struct trusted_key_ops *available_tk_ops[] = {
> > > +#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM)
> > > + &tpm_trusted_key_ops,
> > > +#endif
> > > +};
> > > +static struct trusted_key_ops *tk_ops;
> > > +
> > > +enum {
> > > + Opt_err,
> > > + Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > +static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
> > > + {Opt_new, "new"},
> > > + {Opt_load, "load"},
> > > + {Opt_update, "update"},
> > > + {Opt_err, NULL}
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
> > > + * payload structure
> > > + *
> > > + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
> > > + */
> > > +static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p)
> > > +{
> > > + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> > > + long keylen;
> > > + int ret = -EINVAL;
> > > + int key_cmd;
> > > + char *c;
> > > +
> > > + /* main command */
> > > + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> > > + if (!c)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > + key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
> > > + switch (key_cmd) {
> > > + case Opt_new:
> > > + /* first argument is key size */
> > > + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> > > + if (!c)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > + ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
> > > + if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > + p->key_len = keylen;
> > > + ret = Opt_new;
> > > + break;
> > > + case Opt_load:
> > > + /* first argument is sealed blob */
> > > + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> > > + if (!c)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > + p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
> > > + if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > + ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
> > > + if (ret < 0)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > + ret = Opt_load;
> > > + break;
> > > + case Opt_update:
> > > + ret = Opt_update;
> > > + break;
> > > + case Opt_err:
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > + }
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
> > > +{
> > > + struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
> > > + int ret;
> > > +
> > > + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*p));
> > > + if (ret < 0)
> > > + return p;
> > > + p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
> > > +
> > > + p->migratable = tk_ops->migratable;
> > > +
> > > + return p;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
> > > + *
> > > + * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
> > > + * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
> > > + * adding it to the specified keyring.
> > > + *
> > > + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
> > > + */
> > > +static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
> > > + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> > > +{
> > > + struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
> > > + size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
> > > + char *datablob;
> > > + int ret = 0;
> > > + int key_cmd;
> > > + size_t key_len;
> > > +
> > > + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > + if (!datablob)
> > > + return -ENOMEM;
> > > + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
> > > + datablob[datalen] = '\0';
> > > +
> > > + payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
> > > + if (!payload) {
> > > + ret = -ENOMEM;
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload);
> > > + if (key_cmd < 0) {
> > > + ret = key_cmd;
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + dump_payload(payload);
> > > +
> > > + switch (key_cmd) {
> > > + case Opt_load:
> > > + ret = tk_ops->unseal(payload, datablob);
> > > + dump_payload(payload);
> > > + if (ret < 0)
> > > + pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > + break;
> > > + case Opt_new:
> > > + key_len = payload->key_len;
> > > + ret = tk_ops->get_random(payload->key, key_len);
> > > + if (ret != key_len) {
> > > + pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + ret = tk_ops->seal(payload, datablob);
> > > + if (ret < 0)
> > > + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > + break;
> > > + default:
> > > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > > + }
> > > +out:
> > > + kzfree(datablob);
> > > + if (!ret)
> > > + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
> > > + else
> > > + kzfree(payload);
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
> > > +{
> > > + struct trusted_key_payload *p;
> > > +
> > > + p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
> > > + kzfree(p);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
> > > + */
> > > +static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> > > +{
> > > + struct trusted_key_payload *p;
> > > + struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
> > > + size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
> > > + char *datablob;
> > > + int ret = 0;
> > > +
> > > + if (key_is_negative(key))
> > > + return -ENOKEY;
> > > + p = key->payload.data[0];
> > > + if (!p->migratable)
> > > + return -EPERM;
> > > + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > + if (!datablob)
> > > + return -ENOMEM;
> > > +
> > > + new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
> > > + if (!new_p) {
> > > + ret = -ENOMEM;
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
> > > + datablob[datalen] = '\0';
> > > + ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p);
> > > + if (ret != Opt_update) {
> > > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > > + kzfree(new_p);
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
> > > + new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
> > > + new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
> > > + memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
> > > + dump_payload(p);
> > > + dump_payload(new_p);
> > > +
> > > + ret = tk_ops->seal(new_p, datablob);
> > > + if (ret < 0) {
> > > + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > + kzfree(new_p);
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
> > > + call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
> > > +out:
> > > + kzfree(datablob);
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
> > > + * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
> > > + */
> > > +static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
> > > + size_t buflen)
> > > +{
> > > + const struct trusted_key_payload *p;
> > > + char *bufp;
> > > + int i;
> > > +
> > > + p = dereference_key_locked(key);
> > > + if (!p)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
> > > + bufp = buffer;
> > > + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
> > > + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
> > > + }
> > > + return 2 * p->blob_len;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
> > > + */
> > > +static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
> > > +{
> > > + kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
> > > + .name = "trusted",
> > > + .instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
> > > + .update = trusted_update,
> > > + .destroy = trusted_destroy,
> > > + .describe = user_describe,
> > > + .read = trusted_read,
> > > +};
> > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
> > > +
> > > +static int __init init_trusted(void)
> > > +{
> > > + int i, ret = 0;
> > > +
> > > + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(available_tk_ops); i++) {
> > > + tk_ops = available_tk_ops[i];
> > > +
> > > + if (!(tk_ops && tk_ops->init && tk_ops->seal &&
> > > + tk_ops->unseal && tk_ops->get_random))
> > > + continue;
> > > +
> > > + ret = tk_ops->init();
> > > + if (ret) {
> > > + if (tk_ops->cleanup)
> > > + tk_ops->cleanup();
> > > + } else {
> > > + break;
> > > + }
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /*
> > > + * encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
> > > + * trusted key implementation is not found.
> > > + */
> > > + if (ret == -ENODEV)
> > > + return 0;
> > > +
> > > + return ret;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
> > > +{
> > > + if (tk_ops->cleanup)
> > > + tk_ops->cleanup();
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +late_initcall(init_trusted);
> > > +module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
> > > +
> > > +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
> > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> > > index 8001ab0..32fd1ea 100644
> > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> > > @@ -1,29 +1,26 @@
> > > // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> > > /*
> > > * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
> > > + * Copyright (c) 2019, Linaro Limited
> > > *
> > > * Author:
> > > * David Safford <safford@...ibm.com>
> > > + * Switch to generic trusted key framework: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> > > *
> > > * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> > > */
> > >
> > > #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
> > > -#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > > -#include <linux/module.h>
> > > #include <linux/init.h>
> > > #include <linux/slab.h>
> > > #include <linux/parser.h>
> > > #include <linux/string.h>
> > > #include <linux/err.h>
> > > -#include <keys/user-type.h>
> > > #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> > > #include <linux/key-type.h>
> > > -#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> > > #include <linux/crypto.h>
> > > #include <crypto/hash.h>
> > > #include <crypto/sha.h>
> > > -#include <linux/capability.h>
> > > #include <linux/tpm.h>
> > > #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
> > >
> > > @@ -703,7 +700,6 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> > >
> > > enum {
> > > Opt_err,
> > > - Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
> > > Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
> > > Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable,
> > > Opt_hash,
> > > @@ -712,9 +708,6 @@ enum {
> > > };
> > >
> > > static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
> > > - {Opt_new, "new"},
> > > - {Opt_load, "load"},
> > > - {Opt_update, "update"},
> > > {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"},
> > > {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"},
> > > {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"},
> > > @@ -841,71 +834,6 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -/*
> > > - * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
> > > - * payload and options structures
> > > - *
> > > - * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
> > > - */
> > > -static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p,
> > > - struct trusted_key_options *o)
> > > -{
> > > - substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> > > - long keylen;
> > > - int ret = -EINVAL;
> > > - int key_cmd;
> > > - char *c;
> > > -
> > > - /* main command */
> > > - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> > > - if (!c)
> > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > - key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
> > > - switch (key_cmd) {
> > > - case Opt_new:
> > > - /* first argument is key size */
> > > - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> > > - if (!c)
> > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > - ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
> > > - if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
> > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > - p->key_len = keylen;
> > > - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
> > > - if (ret < 0)
> > > - return ret;
> > > - ret = Opt_new;
> > > - break;
> > > - case Opt_load:
> > > - /* first argument is sealed blob */
> > > - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
> > > - if (!c)
> > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > - p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
> > > - if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
> > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > - ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
> > > - if (ret < 0)
> > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
> > > - if (ret < 0)
> > > - return ret;
> > > - ret = Opt_load;
> > > - break;
> > > - case Opt_update:
> > > - /* all arguments are options */
> > > - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
> > > - if (ret < 0)
> > > - return ret;
> > > - ret = Opt_update;
> > > - break;
> > > - case Opt_err:
> > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > - break;
> > > - }
> > > - return ret;
> > > -}
> > > -
> > > static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
> > > {
> > > struct trusted_key_options *options;
> > > @@ -926,248 +854,99 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
> > > return options;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
> > > +static int tpm_tk_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> > > {
> > > - struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
> > > - int ret;
> > > -
> > > - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p);
> > > - if (ret < 0)
> > > - return p;
> > > - p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > - if (p)
> > > - p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */
> > > - return p;
> > > -}
> > > -
> > > -/*
> > > - * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
> > > - *
> > > - * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
> > > - * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
> > > - * adding it to the specified keyring.
> > > - *
> > > - * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
> > > - */
> > > -static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
> > > - struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> > > -{
> > > - struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
> > > struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
> > > - size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
> > > - char *datablob;
> > > int ret = 0;
> > > - int key_cmd;
> > > - size_t key_len;
> > > int tpm2;
> > >
> > > tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
> > > if (tpm2 < 0)
> > > return tpm2;
> > >
> > > - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
> > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > -
> > > - datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > - if (!datablob)
> > > - return -ENOMEM;
> > > - memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
> > > - datablob[datalen] = '\0';
> > > -
> > > options = trusted_options_alloc();
> > > - if (!options) {
> > > - ret = -ENOMEM;
> > > - goto out;
> > > - }
> > > - payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
> > > - if (!payload) {
> > > - ret = -ENOMEM;
> > > - goto out;
> > > - }
> > > + if (!options)
> > > + return -ENOMEM;
> > >
> > > - key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options);
> > > - if (key_cmd < 0) {
> > > - ret = key_cmd;
> > > + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
> > > + if (ret < 0)
> > > goto out;
> > > - }
> > > + dump_options(options);
> > >
> > > if (!options->keyhandle) {
> > > ret = -EINVAL;
> > > goto out;
> > > }
> > >
> > > - dump_payload(payload);
> > > - dump_options(options);
> > > + if (tpm2)
> > > + ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, p, options);
> > > + else
> > > + ret = key_seal(p, options);
> > > + if (ret < 0) {
> > > + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > + goto out;
> > > + }
> > >
> > > - switch (key_cmd) {
> > > - case Opt_load:
> > > - if (tpm2)
> > > - ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
> > > - else
> > > - ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
> > > - dump_payload(payload);
> > > - dump_options(options);
> > > - if (ret < 0)
> > > - pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > - break;
> > > - case Opt_new:
> > > - key_len = payload->key_len;
> > > - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len);
> > > - if (ret != key_len) {
> > > - pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > + if (options->pcrlock) {
> > > + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> > > + if (ret < 0) {
> > > + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > goto out;
> > > }
> > > - if (tpm2)
> > > - ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
> > > - else
> > > - ret = key_seal(payload, options);
> > > - if (ret < 0)
> > > - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > - break;
> > > - default:
> > > - ret = -EINVAL;
> > > - goto out;
> > > }
> > > - if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
> > > - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> > > out:
> > > - kzfree(datablob);
> > > kzfree(options);
> > > - if (!ret)
> > > - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
> > > - else
> > > - kzfree(payload);
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
> > > +static int tpm_tk_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> > > {
> > > - struct trusted_key_payload *p;
> > > -
> > > - p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
> > > - kzfree(p);
> > > -}
> > > -
> > > -/*
> > > - * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
> > > - */
> > > -static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> > > -{
> > > - struct trusted_key_payload *p;
> > > - struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
> > > - struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
> > > - size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
> > > - char *datablob;
> > > + struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
> > > int ret = 0;
> > > + int tpm2;
> > >
> > > - if (key_is_negative(key))
> > > - return -ENOKEY;
> > > - p = key->payload.data[0];
> > > - if (!p->migratable)
> > > - return -EPERM;
> > > - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
> > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
> > > + if (tpm2 < 0)
> > > + return tpm2;
> > >
> > > - datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > - if (!datablob)
> > > + options = trusted_options_alloc();
> > > + if (!options)
> > > return -ENOMEM;
> > > - new_o = trusted_options_alloc();
> > > - if (!new_o) {
> > > - ret = -ENOMEM;
> > > - goto out;
> > > - }
> > > - new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
> > > - if (!new_p) {
> > > - ret = -ENOMEM;
> > > - goto out;
> > > - }
> > >
> > > - memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
> > > - datablob[datalen] = '\0';
> > > - ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
> > > - if (ret != Opt_update) {
> > > - ret = -EINVAL;
> > > - kzfree(new_p);
> > > + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
> > > + if (ret < 0)
> > > goto out;
> > > - }
> > > + dump_options(options);
> > >
> > > - if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
> > > + if (!options->keyhandle) {
> > > ret = -EINVAL;
> > > - kzfree(new_p);
> > > goto out;
> > > }
> > >
> > > - /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
> > > - new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
> > > - new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
> > > - memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
> > > - dump_payload(p);
> > > - dump_payload(new_p);
> > > + if (tpm2)
> > > + ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options);
> > > + else
> > > + ret = key_unseal(p, options);
> > > + if (ret < 0)
> > > + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > >
> > > - ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
> > > - if (ret < 0) {
> > > - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > - kzfree(new_p);
> > > - goto out;
> > > - }
> > > - if (new_o->pcrlock) {
> > > - ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
> > > + if (options->pcrlock) {
> > > + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
> > > if (ret < 0) {
> > > - pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > - kzfree(new_p);
> > > + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
> > > goto out;
> > > }
> > > }
> > > - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
> > > - call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
> > > out:
> > > - kzfree(datablob);
> > > - kzfree(new_o);
> > > + kzfree(options);
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -/*
> > > - * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
> > > - * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
> > > - */
> > > -static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer,
> > > - size_t buflen)
> > > -{
> > > - const struct trusted_key_payload *p;
> > > - char *bufp;
> > > - int i;
> > > -
> > > - p = dereference_key_locked(key);
> > > - if (!p)
> > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > -
> > > - if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
> > > - bufp = buffer;
> > > - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
> > > - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
> > > - }
> > > - return 2 * p->blob_len;
> > > -}
> > > -
> > > -/*
> > > - * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
> > > - */
> > > -static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
> > > +int tpm_tk_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
> > > {
> > > - kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
> > > + return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len);
> > > }
> > >
> > > -struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
> > > - .name = "trusted",
> > > - .instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
> > > - .update = trusted_update,
> > > - .destroy = trusted_destroy,
> > > - .describe = user_describe,
> > > - .read = trusted_read,
> > > -};
> > > -
> > > -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
> > > -
> > > static void trusted_shash_release(void)
> > > {
> > > if (hashalg)
> > > @@ -1182,14 +961,14 @@ static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
> > >
> > > hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0);
> > > if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
> > > - pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
> > > + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
> > > hmac_alg);
> > > return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
> > > }
> > >
> > > hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0);
> > > if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
> > > - pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
> > > + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
> > > hash_alg);
> > > ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
> > > goto hashalg_fail;
> > > @@ -1217,16 +996,13 @@ static int __init init_digests(void)
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static int __init init_trusted(void)
> > > +static int __init init_tpm_trusted(void)
> > > {
> > > int ret;
> > >
> > > - /* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
> > > - * TPM is not used.
> > > - */
> > > chip = tpm_default_chip();
> > > if (!chip)
> > > - return 0;
> > > + return -ENODEV;
> > >
> > > ret = init_digests();
> > > if (ret < 0)
> > > @@ -1247,7 +1023,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
> > > return ret;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
> > > +static void __exit cleanup_tpm_trusted(void)
> > > {
> > > if (chip) {
> > > put_device(&chip->dev);
> > > @@ -1257,7 +1033,12 @@ static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
> > > }
> > > }
> > >
> > > -late_initcall(init_trusted);
> > > -module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
> > > -
> > > -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
> > > +struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops = {
> > > + .migratable = 1, /* migratable by default */
> > > + .init = init_tpm_trusted,
> > > + .seal = tpm_tk_seal,
> > > + .unseal = tpm_tk_unseal,
> > > + .get_random = tpm_tk_get_random,
> > > + .cleanup = cleanup_tpm_trusted,
> > > +};
> > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_trusted_key_ops);
> >
> > Everywhere: do not use 'tk'. Use 'trusted' in those places. We do not
> > want a new acronym.
>
> Okay.
>
> -Sumit
>
> >
> > /Jarkko
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